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Articles
RECOGNIZING A DAMAGE REMEDY TO
ENFORCE INDIANA’S BILL OF RIGHTS
Rosalie Berger Levinson*
“A damages remedy against the offending party is a vital component of any
scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional guarantees.”1
Assume you represent a public defender from a local city court who
claims he was terminated because he supported the judge’s political
opponent and spoke out regarding alleged incompetency by the sitting
judge. Your client seeks compensatory damages in the form of back
wages and emotional distress as well as an injunction for reinstatement.
You intend to pursue a First Amendment claim based on the alleged
violation of the constitutional rights of free speech and association, but,
because Supreme Court decisions have considerably restricted public
employees’ federal right to speak freely and to whistle-blow,2 you wish
Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. J.D. 1973, Valparaiso
University School of Law; M.A. 1970, B.A. 1969, Indiana University. I wish to acknowledge
the excellent work of my research assistant, Jeromy Cannon, a third-year student at VUSL.
1
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980). The Supreme Court held that
the need to provide damages for constitutional wrongdoing required that government
entities be held accountable even where government officials acted in good faith and thus
are insulated, in their individual capacity, from liability.
2
See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an
Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 25–51 (1990) (arguing that the
Court’s jurisprudence is too restrictive on public employees’ freedom of speech and limits
their right to whistle-blow because it provides judges with too much discretion as to what
types of speech are a matter of public concern); Michael L. Wells, Section 1983, the First
Amendment, and Public Employee Speech: Shaping the Right To Fit the Remedy (and Vice Versa),
35 GA. L. REV. 939, 986–1005 (2001) (arguing that public employees who wish to whistleblow are hindered by the Court’s vague, inconsistent First Amendment jurisprudence). I
have previously argued that the Court has provided insufficient protection for employee
speech, particularly with regard to whistle-blowing. Rosalie Berger Levinson, Silencing
Government Employee Whistleblowers in the Name of “Efficiency”, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 17, 18–
20 (1996).
In addition to substantive limitations on asserting claims under the First Amendment,
there are also serious procedural obstacles. Section 1983 is the core vehicle for bringing
suits against persons who, acting under color of state law, deprive individuals of their
federal constitutional or statutory rights. However, neither a state nor an agency of the
state may be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) for federal constitutional violations. Also,
local government entities can only be held liable for their unconstitutional policies or
customs, not on a theory of respondeat superior. Finally, individual defendants can assert
immunity, either absolute or qualified, from liability for damages. See IVAN BODENSTEINER
& ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT: CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY
§§ 1:6–1:8, 1A:1–1A:6 (2005).
*
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to add a claim under the Indiana Constitution. Article I, section 9 of
Indiana’s Bill of Rights prohibits any law “restraining the free
interchange of thought and opinion, or restricting the right to speak,
write, or print, freely, on any subject whatever.” The Indiana Supreme
Court has interpreted section 9 to provide greater protection than the
Federal Constitution and has allowed it to be invoked as a defense to a
criminal charge of disorderly conduct.3 However, the court has never
decided whether a private cause of action for damages may be brought
under this provision. Indeed, the Indiana Supreme Court has never
determined whether a private cause of action may be brought under any
of the provisions in the Indiana Bill of Rights.4 An appellate court, in Orr
v. Sonnenburg,5 held that mental institution patients who performed
manual labor for the institution were entitled to just compensation under
Article I, section 21, which mandates that “particular services” be
remunerated. However, the Indiana Supreme Court vacated the
holding, concluding that such labor did not constitute “particular
services” under section 21, and thus the issue of damages was avoided.6

3
Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954 (Ind. 1993). The court held that if a defendant’s speech
giving rise to a disorderly conduct conviction is political, the State must demonstrate that it
has not materially burdened the claimant’s opportunity to engage in political expression,
which requires the State to produce evidence that the speech inflicted particularized harm
analogous to tortious injury on readily identifiable private interests. The court reasoned
that evidence of mere annoyance or inconvenience is insufficient. In Whittington v. State,
669 N.E.2d 1363 (Ind. 1996), the court further explicated its understanding of section 9,
emphasizing that this protection is restricted to political speech, whereas the
constitutionality of a disorderly conduct conviction for nonpolitical speech is subjected
only to a rationality standard of review. The significance of the Price decision in the
development of Indiana constitutional law is discussed in Patrick Baude, Has Indiana
Constitution Found Its Epic?, 69 IND. L.J. 849 (1994) and Daniel Conkle, Indiana Supreme
Court’s Emerging Free Speech Doctrine, 69 IND. L.J. 857 (1994).
4
In 1993 the Indiana Supreme Court declined the invitation to determine this question.
Lach v. Lake County, 621 N.E.2d 357 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans. denied Dec. 29, 1993. In
Turner v. Sheriff of Marion County, 94 F. Supp. 2d 966 (S.D. Ind. 2000), the federal court,
pursuant to Rule 15(O) of the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure, asked the Indiana
Supreme Court to determine whether an action could be brought under Article I, section
11, of the state constitution, but the case settled and the issue was never reached. See also
Young v. Ind. Dep’t of Natural Resources, 789 N.E.2d 550, 559 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003),
trans. denied, 804 N.E.2d 754 (Ind. Oct. 22, 2003) (expressly declining to decide whether a
private cause of action for damages exists under the Indiana Constitution); Hilburt v. Town
of Markleville, 649 N.E.2d 1036, 1041 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (“Even assuming, but expressly
not deciding, that an action for damages . . . may be brought under Section 12, [the
plaintiff’s] constitutional arguments fail on the merits.”).
5
542 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
6
Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 421 (Ind. 1991) (stating that “we do not reach the
subsidiary [issue of] . . . the distinction between an award of damages and back wages”).
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Although this would appear to be a very basic, elementary question,
the development of state constitutional law in Indiana, as elsewhere, is a
fairly recent phenomenon. Because of the broad expansion of federal
constitutional liberties under the Warren Court, the Indiana Supreme
Court has had little opportunity to interpret Indiana’s Bill of Rights
generally, much less the specific question of whether a private cause of
action for damages should be recognized. Most civil rights claims have
been brought in federal court under federal law, perhaps with a state
constitutional claim tacked on under the supplemental jurisdiction
provision, leaving this issue to be decided by federal courts with little
guidance from the state judiciary. Indeed, the Southern and Northern
Districts of Indiana have split on the question of a cause of action for
damages under the state constitution. The Northern District has
recognized a cause of action for damages,7 whereas courts from the
Southern District of Indiana have found no basis for implying a private
cause of action.8 The Indiana Supreme Court is now poised to consider
this critical question, having accepted certification from a federal district

7
See Discovery House, Inc. v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis, 43 F. Supp. 2d 997,
1004 (N.D. Ind. 1999). The court relied on the implicit acceptance of this principle by the
Indiana Supreme Court in Bayh v. Sonnenburg. However, as noted supra note 6, the Indiana
Supreme Court specifically refused to reach this issue, deciding instead on the merits.
Nonetheless, the court of appeals in Bayh did assume the existence of a private cause of
action for damages under Indiana’s just compensation provision. It should be noted that
some state courts that recognize damage liability for constitutional violations have relied
on the fact that compensation is permitted under the state “takings” clauses. These courts
have reasoned that if damages are available for deprivations of the right to hold property,
they should be equally available for deprivations of other fundamental constitutional
rights. See, e.g., Fenton v. Groveland Cmty. Serv. Dist., 135 Cal. App. 797, 806, 185 Cal.
Rptr. 758, 763 (1982) (holding that damages should be available for deprivation of the
fundamental right to vote because such are available for takings claims); accord Corum v.
Univ. of N.C., 413 S.E.2d 276, 291 (N.C. 1992); see also Klunk v. County of St. Joseph, 170
F.3d 772, 777–78 (7th Cir. 1999) (assuming summarily that Indiana recognizes a private
right of action for damages under Article I, section 9 because an Indiana appellate court
had addressed the merits of such a claim).
8
See, e.g., Raines v. Strittmatter, No. 1:03-CV-10289-JDTTAB, 2004 WL 2137634 (S.D.
Ind. June 29, 2004). In Boczar v. Kingen, No. IP99-0141-C-T/G, 2000 WL 1137713 (S.D. Ind.
2000), the court, after noting that the Debates of 1850 provide little help, relied on the
Indiana Supreme Court’s reluctance to find an implied cause of action under statutory
provisions as well as the common law understanding of sovereign immunity, which
guided the framers of the state constitution. These arguments are addressed infra Part III.
Other Indiana federal courts have reasoned that this issue should properly be decided by
the state supreme court and not federal district courts. See Estate of O’Bryan v. Town of
Sellersburg, No. 3:02CV00238-DFH-WGH, 2004 WL 1234215 (S.D. Ind. 2004).
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court case, which raises the question in the context of a damage action
brought under Article I, section 9.9
I. INTRODUCTION
As the Burger and Rehnquist Courts began to restrict the
interpretation of federal rights, former Justice Brennan, among others,
urged attorneys to reexamine their state constitutions as an important
supplemental source for the protection of individual rights.10 In 1989,
Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard penned an article inviting Indiana
practitioners to more closely examine Indiana’s Constitution.11 A survey
of Indiana cases demonstrates that attorneys in Indiana have accepted
Justice Shepard’s invitation and, indeed, have successfully litigated
claims brought under the state constitution. By and large, however,
constitutional claims have been raised by defendants who assert
violation of the state constitution’s criminal procedural guarantees12 or
defenses based on civil liberties.13

9
The Indiana Supreme Court has accepted certification from a federal district court in
the Northern District of Indiana. Cantrell v. Morris, Cause No. 94S-0505-CQ-00243. The
specific question directed to the Indiana Supreme Court is: “Does a private right of action
for damages exist under Article I, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution, and, if so, what are
the elements of the action the plaintiff must prove?”
10
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); see also Kathleen C. Herasimchuk, The New Federalism: Judicial
Legislation by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals?, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1481, 1492 (1990) (referring
to Justice Brennan’s article as “a clarion call to state judges to wield their own bill of
rights”).
11
Randall T. Shepard, Second Wind for the Indiana Bill of Rights, 22 IND. L. REV. 575 (1989);
see also Randall T. Shepard, The Maturing Nature of State Constitution Jurisprudence, 30 VAL.
U. L. REV. 421, 456 (1996) (“[W]hat respectable alternative is there to independent state
constitutional jurisprudence? . . . Is it a country where state courts hearing ninety percent
of the litigation resolve the most important cases without regard to their own history or
precedent? Surely not.”).
12
See, e.g., Malinski v. State, 794 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind. 2003) (deciding that Article I,
section 13 mandates that law enforcement officials inform a custodial suspect immediately
when an attorney hired by the suspect’s family to represent him is present at the station);
Bush v. State, 775 N.E.2d 309 (Ind. 2002) (holding that Article I, section 14’s guarantee of
the right against self-incrimination includes the right not to have the prosecutor comment
on a defendant’s failure to take the stand and testify and prohibits jury instructions that call
attention to the fact that defendant could have testified if he chose to do so); State v.
Gerschoffer, 763 N.E.2d 960 (Ind. 2002) (holding that evidence obtained from a roadblock
did not satisfy the requirements of Article I, section 11 and thus such evidence must be
suppressed); Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999) (holding that Indiana’s double
jeopardy clause is broader and more protective than that of the Federal Constitution);
Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77 (Ind. 1995) (holding that a warrantless search of defendant’s
car violated the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article I,
section 11 of the Indiana Constitution) and thus the conviction must be reversed);
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The question of whether a private cause of action for damages may
be implied under Indiana’s Bill of Rights is critical to the development of
the state constitution. To the extent the Indiana Supreme Court
interprets Indiana’s Bill of Rights as guaranteeing forms of liberty that go
beyond the Federal Constitution, to restrict such protection to criminal or
civil defendants will serve as a strong disincentive to attorneys who wish
to heed Justice Shepard’s invitation. More significantly, without a
damage remedy, constitutional wrongdoing will go unredressed and
government officials will have little incentive to observe Indiana’s
fundamental law. Part II of this Article examines this question using the
now well-accepted methodology for constitutional interpretation
adopted by the Indiana Supreme Court, namely, that constitutional
interpretation “is controlled by the text itself, illuminated by history and
by the purpose and structure of our constitution and the case law
surrounding it.”14 Part II shows that this inquiry strongly supports
recognition of a damage action to vindicate the violation of state
constitutional rights. In addition to this historical analysis, the Indiana
Supreme Court has also closely examined how sister states have dealt
with the same constitutional issue.15 The state courts are divided on the
question of whether a private cause of action for damages can be implied
under their constitutions. Part III addresses the competing arguments
that have been made by these courts and explains why those states that
have recognized this significant enforcement mechanism should provide
the model for Indiana.
II. TEXT, HISTORY, PURPOSE, AND CASE PRECEDENT SUPPORT RECOGNITION
OF A DAMAGE REMEDY
The Indiana Supreme Court has explained that it will take an
historical/originalist approach in interpreting the state constitution:
Campbell v. State, 622 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 1993) (deciding that, because Article I, section 13
places a unique value on the defendant’s right to speak out personally in the courtroom,
Indiana’s alibi statute, which mandated that notice be given to the state of an alibi within
twenty days prior to the omnibus date, was unconstitutional and thus defendant’s
conviction must be reversed); Brady v. State, 575 N.E.2d 981 (Ind. 1991) (holding that
Article I, section 13 contains a unique face-to-face element requiring that the witness and
the accused be able to see and recognize each other); Clark v. State, 561 N.E.2d 759 (Ind.
1990) (reversing defendant’s sentence as “disproportionate” and thus in violation of Article
I, section 16, where enhancement under the state’s Habitual Offender Law was based on a
conviction for conduct that the legislature had classified as a misdemeanor).
13
See, e.g., Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954 (Ind. 1993) (holding that the defendant’s
conviction for disorderly conduct, based in part on her protest to the police officers’
conduct, violated Article I, section 9).
14
Id. at 957 (citing State Election Bd. v. Bayh, 521 N.E.2d 1313 (1988)).
15
See infra note 81 and acompanying text.
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“Questions arising under the Indiana Constitution are to be resolved by
‘examining the language of the text in the context of the history
surrounding its drafting and ratification, the purpose and structure of
our Constitution, and case law interpreting the specific provisions.’”16
This inquiry requires an exploration of the state constitutional guarantee
of a remedy “by due course of law,” the principle extant when the
constitution was drafted that courts have inherent authority to award
damages to vindicate constitutional rights, as well as the 1850 Debates
surrounding the adoption of the constitution.
Although there is nothing specific in the text of the Indiana
Constitution regarding remedies for constitutional wrongdoing, some
support for recognition of an implied damage action may be found in
Article I, section 12, which guarantees that a remedy “by due course of
law” is available to anyone “for injury done to him in his person,
property, or reputation” and that “[j]ustice shall be administered . . .
completely and without denial.”17 Concededly, despite section 12’s
guarantee, a long line of cases recognizes the legislature’s power to
modify or abrogate common law rights.18 However, constitutional rights
are not mere common law rights, and, in any event, the Indiana General
Assembly has not legislated a private cause of action for constitutional
wrongdoing. Although this issue was not specifically addressed when
the constitution was enacted, the framers did express their
understanding that the General Assembly would provide a mechanism
for holding the state accountable for its wrongdoing.19 In this context, it
was acknowledged that “if the Legislature neglects to carry out the

16
Ratliff v. Cohen, 693 N.E.2d 530, 534 (Ind. 1998) (quoting Boehm v. Town of St. John,
675 N.E.2d 218, 321 (Ind. 1996)).
17
IND. CONST. art. I, § 12.
18
Martin v. Richey, 711 N.E.2d 1273, 1283 (Ind. 1999). The Indiana Supreme Court has
also rejected the view that the Open Courts Clause is a “kind of jurisdiction-concurring
mechanism for statutory rights.” Blanck v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 829 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Ind.
2005). In determining whether a private cause of action can be implied under a statute, the
court explained that legislative intent is the core inquiry. Id. However, unlike statutory
rights where deference to legislative intent should be paramount, constitutional rights
stand on their own because the framers intended for the Indiana Bill of Rights to be the
fundamental law of the state.
19
Article I, section 12 was proposed, read three times, and passed without discussion.
See JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION OF THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF INDIANA TO AMEND THE
CONSTITUTION 187, 188, 571, 579 (1851). On the other hand, there was significant debate
regarding Article IV, section 24, which addressed the problem of “special laws” that were
used to hold the state accountable for its wrongdoing. See discussion infra Part III.C.
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details, the Constitution will itself afford the remedy.”20 The idea that the
constitution itself gives courts authority to redress government
wrongdoing is most clearly articulated in section 12.
The Indiana Supreme Court has ruled that, consistent with due
process, some remedy must be provided where vested rights are at stake.
In a 1910 decision, the court held that when dealing with vested rights,
the legislature cannot take away a remedy without providing some other
means of enforcement because total withdrawal of a remedy would
constitute subversion of the right itself.21 This principle was reaffirmed
in a 1978 Indiana Court of Appeals decision noting that “due process
forbids the immediate withdrawal of all legal means of enforcing a right,
since that would amount to withdrawal of the right itself.”22 Unlike
common law rights, constitutional rights cannot be altered or withdrawn
by legislative enactment. They are vested rights that must be protected
from government encroachment.
This due process concern is reflected in a 1937 decision invalidating
a state law that purportedly prohibited Indiana courts from testing the
constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly.23 The Indiana
Supreme Court held that this law violated Article I, section 12 because an
individual cannot be denied the right to challenge the constitutionality of
a legislative enactment. In support of its holding, the court cited the case
of Consolidated Gas Co. v. Mayer24:
Every individual who feels himself aggrieved either by
the action of some other individual or of the state or the
nation is secured the right to bring his grievance before
some court . . . somewhere or other there is provided for
him a forum to which he can present his case . . . [t]hat is
“due process of law,” a heritage from long centuries of
struggle, which this nation and its constituent states

REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA 1850 Vol. 2, at 1279 (2 vols. 1850) [hereinafter
DEBATES] (emphasis added); see also infra Part III.C (discussing the Debates of 1850).
21
Sansberry v. Hughes, 174 Ind. 638, 640, 92 N.E. 783, 784 (1910).
22
DeHart v. Anderson, 178 Ind. App. 581, 585–86, 383 N.E.2d 431, 435 (1978).
23
Pennington v. Stewart, 212 Ind. 553, 558–59, 10 N.E.2d 619, 622 (1937) (holding that
despite the general validity of the statutory elimination of the cause of action for alienation
of affection, the General Assembly could not prohibit and criminalize the filing of “any
pleading or paper setting forth or seeking to recover upon any cause of action abolished or
barred” by the statute).
24
146 F. 150 (C.C.N.Y. 1906), cited in Pennington, 10 N.E.2d at 622.
20

THE
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have deposited in the cornerstones of their written
Constitutions.25
More recently, in Martin v. Richey,26 the Indiana Supreme Court
relied in part on Article I, section 12 to hold that its two-year medical
malpractice statute of limitations was unconstitutional as applied to a
plaintiff who could not with due diligence discover that medical
malpractice had occurred.
The court reasoned that the Indiana
Constitution guarantees that injured citizens have the right to a remedy
and that those responsible should be held accountable for injuries
suffered.27 Indiana’s due course of law provision is the “cornerstone” of
its constitution because, without a judicial remedy, all the core values
reflected in the Indiana Bill of Rights become subject to the whim of the
executive and legislative branches of government.
In addition to its specific guarantee of a remedy “by due course of
law,” the purpose and structure of the Indiana Constitution support
recognition of an implied cause of action to address constitutional
wrongdoing. First, it is clear that the framers were concerned that
individual liberty be protected, as reflected in their lengthy enumeration
of rights in Article I, which sets forth thirty-four detailed provisions, as
compared to the truncated Federal Bill of Rights, which appeared only as
ten amendments to the original Constitution.28 Second, it is clear that
they envisioned a special role for the judiciary to play in protecting those
rights. The Indiana Supreme Court has noted that the drafters of the
Indiana Constitution were staunch believers in Jacksonian democracy,
Id. at 152.
711 N.E.2d 1273 (Ind. 1999).
27
Id. at 1283; see also City of Fort Wayne v. Cameron, 267 Ind. 329, 370 N.E.2d 338 (1977)
(holding that to require strict adherence to a sixty-day notice rule where the plaintiff was
mentally and physically disabled during the notice period would violate Article I, section
12); State ex rel. Hurd v. Davis, 226 Ind. 526, 533, 82 N.E.2d 82, 85 (1948) (holding that
Article I, section 12 guarantees “parties to the action and their attorneys free access to the
papers in any case”); Square D. Co. v. O’Neal, 225 Ind. 49, 56, 72 N.E.2d 654, 657 (1947)
(holding that any “regulation which would virtually deny our citizens the right to resort to
this court would necessarily be unreasonable” and would violate Article I, section 12).
28
The North Carolina Supreme Court relied on this argument to recognize a damage
claim for violation of the free speech rights of its public employees. See Corum v. Univ. of
N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 783, 413 S.E.2d 276, 290 (1992) (“Our Constitution is more detailed and
specific than the federal Constitution in the protection of rights of its citizens . . . . We give
our Constitution a liberal interpretation in favor of its citizens with respect to those
provisions which were designed to safeguard the liberty and security of the citizens in
regard to person and property.”). It further reasoned that “[i]t is the state judiciary that has
the responsibility to protect the state constitutional rights of the citizens; this obligation to
protect the fundamental rights of individuals is as old as the state.” Id. at 783, 413 S.E.2d at
290.
25
26
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i.e., limited government and the protection of inalienable rights.29 When
the issue of state sovereign immunity came up during the Debates on the
1851 Constitution, several of the drafters spoke against this “antiquated”
doctrine and instead recognized “the necessity of providing for
awarding complete justice to individuals . . . for of what use or benefit is
government, unless it is to carry out to the highest practical point of
development, the fundamental principles of protection to life, liberty and
property?”30
Early Indiana court decisions handed down at the time of the
adoption of the constitution reflect this philosophy.31 Just four years
after the 1851 enactment of the constitution, the Indiana Supreme Court
was asked to determine the constitutionality of the Liquor Act of 1855.
In Herman v. State,32 the court celebrated the significance of the state’s
written constitution and emphasized the important duty of the judiciary
to enforce constitutional guarantees:
“[A]long with our written
constitution we have a judiciary whose duty it is, as the only means of
securing to the people safety from legislative aggression, to annul all
legislative action without the pale of those instruments.”33 In deciding
that the Liquor Act interfered with rights guaranteed under Article I,
section 1,34 the court explained that “the enjoyment of these [natural]
29
Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 962 (Ind. 1993) (recognizing that anti-government
Jacksonian Democrats launched the constitutional revision from which our current
document emerged); see also Michael DeBoer, Equality as a Fundamental Value in the Indiana
Constitution, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 489, 513–19 (2004) (describing the Jacksonian movement and
its dominance in the General Assembly that adopted the 1851 Constitution).
30
Comment of Mr. Howe, DEBATES, supra note 20, at 1279–80. See further discussion
infra Part III.C.
31
See Town of St. John v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 665 N.E.2d 965, 968–74 (Ind. T.C.),
rev’d on other grounds, 675 N.E.2d 318 (Ind. 1996) (referencing the importance of examining
judicial decisions contemporaneous with adoption of the constitution).
32
8 Ind. 545 (1855).
33
Id. at 551–52 (citing Marbury as establishing the duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is). Similarly, in Madison & Indianapolis R.R. v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind. 217, 227–29
(1856), Justice Perkins explains that the whole purpose of the written constitution was to
safeguard natural rights: “We come to the conclusion, then, that the courts should declare
void a law in violation of this fundamental principle of the constitution—a law in violation
of the natural rights of man.” See also Finney v. Johnson, 179 N.E.2d 718, 721 (Ind. 1962)
(recognizing that “the Constitution is a fundamental instrument, not to be stretched and
strained to meet the exigencies and necessities of the moment,” and that it “was framed to
be strictly observed by all public officials and particularly the courts as guardians of the
citizens’ rights stated therein”).
34
The Indiana Constitution provides:
WE DECLARE, That all people are created equal, that they are
endowed by their CREATOR with certain inalienable rights; that
among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that all
power is inherent in the People; and that all free governments are, and
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rights is the great end and aim of the constitution itself” and that
Indiana’s system of government was “designed to allow to each
individual the largest liberty consistent with the welfare of the whole,
and to subject the private affairs of the citizen to the least possible
governmental interference.”35
The importance that Indiana courts have placed on ensuring
enforcement of its constitution is also reflected in the broad public
standing doctrine that was recently reinvigorated by the court. In Embry
v. O’Bannon,36 the Indiana Supreme Court permitted a taxpayers’ lawsuit
challenging the state’s provision of funds to pay teachers who instruct in
parochial schools allegedly in violation of Article I, section 6. In finding
that the taxpayers had standing to bring this action, the court
acknowledged that, in contrast to federal law, Indiana’s broad public
standing doctrine, dating back more than 150 years, eliminates the need
for a plaintiff to demonstrate a specific interest in the outcome of
litigation different from that shared by the general public.37 The doctrine
was developed to enable citizens and taxpayers to enforce a public duty
without having to show individualized harm. Further, the Indiana
Supreme Court has specifically noted that, since the nineteenth century,
the public standing doctrine has permitted claims challenging
unconstitutional government action.38 Concededly, the public standing
doctrine does not directly speak to whether the framers would recognize
a private damage action because its focus is on the need to vindicate
public as opposed to private rights and because the private cause of
action was provided in these cases by the writ of mandamus.
Nonetheless, the public standing doctrine expresses an early voiced
concern that constitutional violations not go unredressed, even if normal
standing jurisprudence precludes access to the courts.

of right ought to be, founded on their authority, and instituted for their
peace, safety, and well-being.
IND. CONST. art. I, § 1.
35
Herman, 8 Ind. at 557, 563–64; see also State ex rel. Holt v. Denny, 118 Ind. 449, 21 N.E.
274 (1888) (holding that residency and political limitations for fire and police
commissioners violated Article I, section 23); Graffty v. City of Rushville, 107 Ind. 502, 8
N.E. 609 (1886) (invalidating a fee for the sale of goods not manufactured or grown in a
local county as violating Article I, section 23 due to the imposition of a special burden).
36
798 N.E.2d 157 (Ind. 2003).
37
Id. at 159–60.
38
Cittadine v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 790 N.E.2d 978, 979–80, 983 (Ind. 2003) (noting that
“the principles embodied in the public standing doctrine have also frequently been applied
in cases challenging the constitutionality of government action, statutes, or ordinances”).
The court in Cittadine cites to several cases from the nineteenth century allowing
constitutional challenges to be brought based on this doctrine.
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In addition to the framers’ understanding that the government
would be held accountable for its wrongdoing and the early Indiana
decisions emphasizing the judiciary’s responsibility to enforce
constitutional guarantees, an examination of the common law extant in
the 1850s reveals a general understanding that damages were a
recognized remedy for invasions of liberty. Several state courts that
have recognized a private cause of action for damages under their
constitutions have relied upon the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Bivens v. Six Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,39
where the Court held that an implied cause of action for damages may
be brought directly under the Fourth Amendment.40 In reaching its
conclusion, the Supreme Court cited early decisions in which damages
were awarded in voting rights and eminent domain cases.41 After
exploring several of these cases, the Court concluded that “[h]istorically,
damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of
personal interests in liberty.”42 The Court also cited Marbury v.
Madison:43 “The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right
of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury.”44 Further, in a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan
asserted that even if the legislative record was silent as to the intent of
the framers, the “contemporary modes of jurisprudential thought . . .
appeared to link ‘rights’ and ‘remedies’ in a 1:1 correlation,” and that this
supports the notion that the right to sue for damages stems from the
Federal Constitution itself.45 He reasoned that it was the judiciary’s role
“to vindicate social policies which, by virtue of their inclusion in the
Constitution, are aimed predominately at restraining the Government as
an instrument of the popular will.”46
The Bivens analysis was
subsequently extended to permit money damages for violations of the
403 U.S. 388 (1977).
See JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS,
CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES 7-12-13, –23 (3d ed. 2000).
41
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395–96. The historical pedigree is reflected in the decisions the
Supreme Court relied upon in Bivens. For example, in Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536
(1927), the Court upheld an award of $5,000 in damages on behalf of an African-American
citizen who was denied the right to vote pursuant to an unconstitutional Texas law. The
Court noted “[t]hat private damage may be caused by such political action and may be
recovered for in suit at law hardly has been doubted for over two hundred years.” Id. at
540.
42
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395.
43
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
44
Id. at 163.
45
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 402 n.3 (Harlan, J., concurring). Note how this parallels Mr. Howe’s
comment during the Debates of 1850 that the Indiana Constitution itself provides the
remedy for government wrongdoing. See DEBATES, supra note 20.
46
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 404.
39
40
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Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause47 and the Eight Amendment’s
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.48
Although Indiana courts should not rely on Bivens nor be bound by
its limitations,49 the notions that invasions of personal interests demand
judicial recognition of a damages remedy and that damages have been a
traditional common law remedy were familiar to those who drafted and
ratified the Indiana Constitution. This is reflected in the Indiana
Supreme Court’s own citation to Marbury in Herman v. State50 and in the
framers’ expression of disdain for a sovereign immunity defense to
damage liability during the Debates of 1850.51
Other state courts have found support for an implied damage
remedy in the common-law doctrine of implied remedies that is
expressed in section 874A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which
states:
When a legislative provision protects a class of persons
by proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not
provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may if
it determines that the remedy is appropriate in
furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed
to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an
injured member of the class a right of action, using a
suitable existing tort action or a new cause of action
analogous to an existing tort action.52

Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
49
Unlike federal judges, state judges are not constrained by policies of federalism, which
assert that federal courts should not constitutionalize state torts. Because federal courts
make laws that bind all states and state officials, their decisions raise unique concerns. See
Binette v. Sabo, 710 A.2d 688, 697 (Conn. 1998) (“Bivens and its progeny serve only as a
guide. Because we are considering a claim under our state constitution, those federal court
cases, based on the Federal Constitution, are not determinative.”).
Bivens was subsequently narrowed by the Supreme Court’s ruling in F.D.I.C. v. Meyer,
holding that an administrative agency could not be held liable for damages for violations of
the U.S. Constitution. 510 U.S. 471 (1994). The Court reasoned that “the purpose of Bivens
is to deter the officer,” and thus a claim against the government itself was unwarranted. Id.
at 485 (emphasis added). It also reasoned that the “potentially enormous financial burden
for the Federal Government” was a special factor counseling hesitation. Id. at 486. This
Article contends that entities should be held liable for state constitutional wrongdoing and
that sovereign immunity is not a bar. See infra Part III.C.
50
See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
51
See discussion infra Part III.C.
52
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A (1979).
47
48
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A comment by the reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts explains
that the term “legislative provision” also includes constitutional
provisions as well as statutes, ordinances, and administrative
regulations.53 Further, the comment indicates that “[t]he primary test for
determining whether the court should provide a tort remedy for
violation of the legislative provisions is whether this is consistent with
the legislative provision, appropriate for promoting its policy, and
needed to assure its effectiveness.”54 When state constitutional rights are
at issue, these three criteria clearly support recognition of a “new cause
of action.”
As chronicled by Jennifer Friesen in her treatise on state
constitutional law, “[m]ost of the state courts ruling on this question
have endorsed the theory expressed in section 874A when granting a
right to sue for damages for deprivation of state constitutional rights.”55
She notes that courts in several states have cited this provision, often
together with Bivens, to support recognition of a cause of action even in
the absence of implementing legislation.56 The principle that the
violation of rights secured by fundamental charters and constitutions is
actionable for damages was also a long-standing tradition of English
common law, which several states have noted.57 Because section 874A
has its roots in state common law, it provides additional support for
recognizing a type of “constitutional tort” damage action.58

Id. at cmt. (a).
Id. at cmt. (h).
55
FRIESEN, supra note 40, at 7–15. Specific decisions citing section 874A include Binette v.
Sabo, 244 Conn. 3, 32–35, 710 A.2d 688, 693–94 (1998); Dorwart v. Caraway, 312 Mont. 1, 14,
58 P.3d 128, 136 (2002); Brown v. State, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 186–87, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1138 (1996);
and Shields v. Gerhart, 163 Vt. 219, 230–31, 658 A.2d 924, 932 (1995).
56
FRIESEN, supra note 40, at 7–15. Friesen presents a state-by-state listing in section 7-7.
57
See Widgeon v. E. Shore Hosp. Ctr., 479 A.2d 921, 924 (Md. 1984) (noting that English
common law allowed punitive and compensatory damages for unlawful searches by the
king’s messengers); Dorwart v. Caraway, 312 Mont. 1, 10–13, 58 P.3d 128, 133–36 (2002)
(citing the strong trend among the states to recognize an action based on sources as old as
English common law, the court concludes that state constitutional rights to privacy, due
process, and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures mandate recognition of a
judicial remedy); Brown v. State, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 188–89, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1139 (1996)
(noting that in England, violations of the Magna Carta by government officials were
actionable in a case for damages, even without enabling legislation from Parliament).
Further, the Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) cited with
approval an early English case that had upheld damages for an unlawful search and
seizure. Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
58
See Jennifer Friesen, Recovering Damages for State Bills of Rights Claims, 63 TEX. L. REV.
1269, 1281 (1984–1985), wherein the author contends that, rather than relying upon Bivens,
state courts have discovered this “much older body of law generated by state courts which
53
54
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For example, New York’s high court invoked section 874A to
support its ruling that the violation of rights secured by the New York
Constitution gives rise to a direct claim for damages on behalf of a class
of non-white males who alleged that they were subjected to illegal and
discriminatory police investigations.59 The court reasoned that section
874A authorizes the judiciary to imply a civil damage remedy for
violations of constitutional duties whenever such would further the
purpose of the provision and ensure its effectiveness.60 In addition, the
court cited the Bivens holding that constitutional guarantees should be
protected even absent legislative enactments.61 Similarly, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina held that a faculty member allegedly discharged
for opposing his superiors on a matter of school policy had a direct cause
of action against the state for violation of his free speech rights under the
state constitution.62 The court relied upon the common-law mandate
that state constitutional rights be enforceable because a remedy should
be available for every wrong.63 Further, the Connecticut Supreme Court
has relied on the arguments set forth in Bivens as well as the authority
found in section 874A to support its holding that the judiciary has
inherent authority to recognize a damage claim for state constitutional
violations.64
The fact that Indiana courts have long entertained suits for
declaratory or injunctive relief for constitutional wrongdoing should
lead to a finding that an implied cause of action for damages is also
appropriate. By statute, Indiana’s Declaratory Judgment provision
authorizes courts to award “further relief.”65 Further, without statutory
more directly supports judicial creation of a damage remedy for state constitutional
deprivations . . . .” See also T. Hunter Jefferson, Constitutional Wrongs and Common Law
Principles: The Case for the Recognition of State Constitutional Tort Actions Against State
Governments, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1525, 1574 (1997) (reasoning that “[s]ection 874A provides a
viable alternative for state courts that may be unwilling to rely completely on English
common law precedents”).
59
Brown v. State, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 652 N.Y.S.2d 223 (1996).
60
Id. at 187, 674 N.E.2d at 1138, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
61
Id. at 192, 674 N.E.2d at 1141, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 235.
62
Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 783, 413 S.E.2d 276, 290 (1992).
63
Id. at 782, 413 S.E.2d at 289.
64
Binette v. Sabo, 244 Conn. 23, 32–35, 710 A.2d 688, 693 (1998); see also Phillips v. Youth
Dev. Program, Inc., 390 Mass. 652, 657, 459 N.E.2d 453, 457 (1993) (relying in part on Bivens
to support a cause of action for alleged dismissal from employment without due process).
65
Indiana’s declaratory judgment provision specifies that:
Further relief based on declaratory judgment or decree may be granted
whenever necessary or proper. The application for further relief must
be by petition to a court having jurisdiction to grant the relief. If the
application is deemed sufficient, the court shall, on reasonable notice,
require any adverse party whose rights have been adjudicated by the
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authorization, in Bell v. Hood,66 the United States Supreme Court
recognized that “where federally protected rights have been invaded, it
has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust
their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief.”67 Although Bell arose
in the context of enforcing federal statutory rights, Justice Harlan, in his
concurring opinion in Bivens, relied on Bell to buttress the claim that
courts have the inherent power to grant damages even in the absence of
explicit congressional authorization of a remedy: “The presumed
availability of federal equitable relief against threatened invasions of
constitutional interests appears entirely to negate the contention that the
status of an interest as constitutionally protected divests federal courts of
the power to grant damages absent express congressional
authorization.”68 In Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized that imposing
a more stringent test where constitutional, as opposed to statutory
claims, are at issue is clearly wrong because “the judiciary has a
particular responsibility to assure the vindication of constitutional
interests . . . . [A] court of law vested with jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a suit has the power—and therefore the duty—to make
principled choices among traditional judicial remedies.”69
Indiana courts have long recognized that constitutional rights may
be enforced through suits seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.70
declaratory judgment or decree to show cause why further relief
should not be immediately granted.
IND.CODE § 34-14-1-8 (2004).
66
327 U.S. 678 (1946).
67
Id. at 684.
68
Bivens v. Six Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 403 (1977)
(Harlan, J., concurring). Bell is also relied upon in the majority opinion. Id. at 392.
69
Id. at 407–08 n.8.
70
See, e.g., Humphries v. Clinic for Women, 796 N.E.2d 247, 249 (Ind. 2003) (holding that
plaintiffs were entitled to a declaratory judgment that Indiana’s Medicaid Program, which
pays for abortion only if necessary to preserve a woman’s life or in cases of rape or incest,
violates Indiana’s Privileges and Immunities Clause to the extent it denied payment for
pregnancies that create “a serious risk of substantial irreversible impairment of a major
bodily function”); Doe v. O’Connor, 790 N.E.2d 985 (Ind. 2003) (rejecting plaintiff’s suit for
a declaratory judgment that Indiana’s Sex and Violent Offender Registry violated his rights
under the state constitution); Clem v. Christole, 582 N.E.2d 780 (Ind. 1991) (upholding
plaintiffs’ right to injunctive relief against enforcement of a state law that contravened an
existing restrictive covenant, contrary to Article I, section 24 of the state constitution, which
prohibits laws impairing obligation of contracts); State v. Nixon, 270 Ind. 192, 384 N.E.2d
152 (1979) (upholding action by plaintiffs seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
regarding state law that permitted pari-mutuel wagering upon horse races and harness
races, and finding that Article XV, section 1 of the state constitution was intended to
prohibit all mischief occasioned by lotteries and that this would include pari-mutuel
gambling); Jacob Weinberg News Agency, Inc. v. Marion, 163 Ind. App. 181, 322 N.E.2d 730
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Further, Indiana courts have observed the well-established doctrine that
“a right that is protectable in a court of equity against threatened
invasion is certainly broad enough to warrant an action at law for
injuries resulting from a consummated violation thereof.”71 Finally, the
requirement in Article I, section 12 that “[j]ustice be administered . . .
completely, and without denial” lends further support to the notion that
the framers envisioned judicial authority to award damages to fully
vindicate violations of the fundamental law.
Finally, policy arguments should be discussed, although generally
these play a lesser role in constitutional adjudication because of the
countervailing principle that policy decisions are best left to the
legislative branch. Nonetheless, the Indiana Supreme Court has not
ignored the policy implications of their constitutional decisions,72 and
here policy arguments favor recognition of a private cause of action for
damages.
The compelling policy arguments for government
accountability were expressed by the Supreme Court in Owen v. City of
Independence.73 In this case, the private cause of action was provided by
42 U.S.C. § 1983, but the Court had to determine whether municipal
entities should be subject to a damage remedy for violation of federal
constitutional rights even where officials acted in good faith. The Court

(1975) (allowing the plaintiff to contest the constitutionality of a law allegedly infringing on
section 9 free speech rights under the Declaratory Judgment Act); Finney v. Johnson, 242
Ind. 465, 179 N.E.2d 718 (1962) (holding that plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction against
the enforcement of a tax provision, which violated Article X, section 1’s requirement of “a
uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation”); Dep’t of Ins. v. Schoonover, 225 Ind.
187, 72 N.E.2d 747 (1947) (permitting plaintiffs to sue for declaratory and injunctive relief
that a provision in Indiana’s insurance law was unconstitutional because it violated
section 1 and section 23 of Article I of the state constitution); State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd,
217 Ind. 348, 28 N.E.2d 256 (1940) (allowing taxpayers to challenge the use of taxes to
benefit parochial schools, allegedly contrary to Article I, sections 4 and 6).
71
Patton v. Jacobs, 118 Ind. App. 358, 362, 78 N.E.2d 789, 790 (1948).
72
See, e.g., Martin v. Richey, 711 N.E.2d 1273, 1279 (Ind. 1999) (recognizing the public
policy implications of a statute of limitations period, as applied to the plaintiff, that
“imposes an impossible condition on her access to the courts” because her cancer had a
long latency period); Bals v. Verduzco, 600 N.E.2d 1353, 1355 (Ind. 1992) (noting the
important public policy of not requiring an employee to “relinquish the value of a good
reputation” upon entering the workplace in holding that an intra-corporate communication
to be a publication under defamation law); Finney v. Johnson, 242 Ind. 465, 469, 179 N.E.2d
718, 720 (1962) (holding that under Article X, section 1, requiring uniform taxation, the
“inequities are too great” to allow a formula based on real property values to estimate the
taxable value of household goods); Pennington v. Stewart, 212 Ind. 553, 556, 10 N.E.2d 619,
621 (1937) (noting the policy considerations, particularly gender equality, relating to the
question of the constitutionality of the General Assembly’s elimination of the tort of
alienation of affection).
73
445 U.S. 622 (1980).
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reasoned that the denial of a damage remedy would have “the
deleterious effect of freezing constitutional law in its current state of
development, for without a meaningful remedy aggrieved individuals
will have little incentive to seek vindication” of constitutional
deprivations.74 In addition, the Court explained that liability would
encourage government officials, both executive and legislative, to err on
the side of protecting constitutional rights and that well-established
notions of fairness as well as the doctrine of equitable loss-spreading
justified imposing costs on taxpayers for the official misconduct of
government.75 In many situations, there is a real threat that without a
damage remedy some victims will have no remedy because injunctive
relief is inappropriate or moot.76 Moreover, without the fear of damages,
government officials may not be deterred from ignoring constitutional
rights.77
Although normally policy arguments are best addressed to the
legislative branch of government, because the Indiana General Assembly
has not spoken on the issue, the state judiciary should step in to fill this
critical void. The fact that civil suits for damages have not been filed
under the state constitution, or are merely appended to federal claims
with little discussion, reflects the reality that few private attorneys in
Indiana are willing to incur the costs of vindicating state constitutional
deprivations. Certainly, there are competing concerns that government
not be burdened by frivolous actions, but the rules of procedure, which
permit sanctions for attorneys who file frivolous or improper lawsuits
and which authorize summary judgment, significantly reduce the risk
that Indiana courts will be burdened with such litigation.78 In addition,
it should be emphasized that recognition of a damage remedy does not
mean that a plaintiff will succeed on the merits. For example, the
Indiana Supreme Court may decide that Article I, section 9 does not
Id. at 651 n.33.
Id. at 652; see also Jefferson, supra note 58, at 1549 (reasoning that imposing
government liability for state constitutional tort violations forces the state to accept
responsibility for those it places in positions of authority, deters future constitutional
violations, places the burden of providing compensation on the party that can afford to do
so, namely the government, and reinforces the moral accountability of the state).
76
See Bivens v. Six Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410
(1977) (“For people in Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or nothing.”).
77
See Brown v. State, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 192, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1141, 652 N.Y.S.2d 223, 235
(1996) (arguing that damages are necessary to deter government misconduct and that
injunctive or declaratory relief is insufficient where claimants did not have the opportunity
to obtain injunctive relief before the constitutional wrongdoing and they have no basis to
support an award enjoining future wrongs).
78
IND. R. TRIAL PROC. 11; IND. R. TRIAL PROC. 56.
74
75
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protect Indiana employees from patronage dismissals.79 The key
argument here is that if the court finds a violation of section 9, it should
have inherent power to remedy that wrongdoing by awarding, where
appropriate, damages. Further, although a ruling permitting a damage
action for constitutional wrongdoing may lead to the filing of more suits
in the state courts, the recognition of a damage remedy to enforce
Indiana’s fundamental law should be viewed as a positive
development.80
III. ARGUMENTS FROM SISTER STATES
In addition to examining text, history, and Indiana case precedent, in
recent years the Indiana Supreme Court has devoted significant attention
to decisions from sister states interpreting their own constitutions.81
Although the state courts remain deeply divided on the question of
whether a private cause of action for damages may be brought under
their respective state constitutions, 82 a recent Montana Supreme Court
79
This is one of the issues raised currently in the case that is before the Indiana Supreme
Court. See supra note 9.
80
See Brennan, supra note 10, at 498, rejecting the “flood of litigation” rationale as a basis
for denying a remedy for constitutional wrongdoing:
A solution that shuts the courthouse door in the face of the litigant
with a legitimate claim for relief, particularly a claim of deprivation of
a constitutional right, seems to be not only the wrong tool but also a
dangerous tool for solving the problem. The victims of the use of that
tool are most often the litigants most in need of judicial protection of
their rights—the poor, the underprivileged, the deprived minorities.
Id.
81
See, e.g., Fowler v. State, 829 N.E.2d 459 (Ind. 2005) (referring to the conclusion of
several other states concerning the applicability of forfeiture to a defendant’s right to
confront witnesses under the federal and state constitutions); Doe v. O’Connor, 790 N.E.2d
985 (Ind. 2003) (looking to interpretations of inalienable rights clauses of Alabama, Alaska,
Idaho, and Nevada when considering Article I, section 1 of the Indiana Constitution);
Martin v. Richey, 711 N.E.2d 1263 (Ind. 1999) (concluding that the court’s holding that a
two-year statute of limitations violated Article I, section 12 as applied to the plaintiff, who
could not have discovered her injury within the limitations period, was consistent with the
analogous analysis of Kentucky, Ohio, and Texas); In re Zumbrun, 626 N.E.2d 452, 455 n.10
(Ind. 1993) (looking to the Minnesota Constitution in determining that a state bankruptcy
law that exempted an unlimited amount of intangible assets violates Article I, section 22,
which demands that the exemption be “reasonable”); State v. Nixon, 270 Ind. 192, 384
N.E.2d 152 (1979) (looking to the decisions of Colorado, Illinois, Utah, Kentucky, and
Nebraska to help define the bounds of prohibited lotteries with respect to a statute
authorizing pari-mutuel horse wagering).
82
See FRIESEN, supra note 40, § 7-7(a), at 7-19-20. Professor Friesen provides a state-bystate review of this issue in section 7-7. The issue is complicated because not only do courts
oftentimes limit their holdings to claims arising out of a particular constitutional clause, but
they may also approve suit only against a particular category of defendants. As to Indiana,
Professor Friesen notes that the question “appears to be an open one.” She discusses
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decision asserts that the strong trend among the states is to recognize a
right to sue for money damages for alleged violations of state
constitutional rights. In Dorwart v. Caraway,83 the court surveyed recent
decisions and cited data indicating that by 1998, some twenty-one states
had recognized an implied cause of action for state constitutional
violations and that three additional states suggested they might do so
under some circumstances. Further, at least four states had enacted
statutes that authorize causes of action for violation of state
constitutional rights.84 The court joined this trend and recognized the
right to sue for damages for violation of state constitutional rights to
privacy, to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, and to the fair
process of law.85
On the other hand, decisions from two state supreme courts since
1998 suggest some movement in the opposite direction. Although the
Utah Supreme Court initially ruled that all violations of individual rights
secured by self-executing constitutional provisions could be vindicated
by money damages, it has subsequently reined in that principle by
requiring that a plaintiff show “flagrant” violation of constitutional
rights as well as the unavailability of existing remedies to redress injury,
including an explanation as to why equitable relief is inadequate.86 In
Matovina v. Hult, 125 Ind. App. 236, 123 N.E.2d 893 (1955), in which the court appeared to
allow a prisoner to bring a tort claim for false imprisonment based on his constitutional
claim that he was treated with “unnecessary rigor” contrary to Article I, section 16. Second,
she cites Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398 (Ind. 1991). Neither case directly speaks to the
question of a private cause of action for damages. The first discusses the availability of a
tort action for constitutional wrongdoing, while, as previously discussed, the Indiana
Supreme Court in Sonnenburg specifically refused to address the question of a private
action for damages, instead denying the plaintiffs relief on the merits. See supra note 6 and
accompanying text.
83
312 Mont. 1, 58 P.3d 128 (2002).
84
Id. at 10, 58 P.3d at 133. Gail Donoghue and Jonathan Edelstein report:
By 1998, twenty-one states had recognized an implied cause of action
for state constitutional violations.
Three additional states had
indicated that they would do so under certain narrow circumstances.
A private cause of action has been recognized in a twenty-fifth state by
federal courts and four states have enacted statutes that authorize
causes of action for violation of state constitutional rights. Seven states
have specifically rejected state constitutional causes of action.
Gail Donoghue & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Life After Brown: The Future of State Constitutional
Tort Actions in New York, 42 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 447, 447 n.2 (1998).
85
312 Mont. at 14, 58 P.3d at 136. Note that the court rejected a qualified immunity
defense, refusing defendants’ argument that the court adopt § 1983’s immunity defenses.
Id. at 20, 21, 58 P.3d at 140.
86
Spackman v. Bd. of Educ., 16 P.3d 533, 538 (Utah 2000) (holding that “a self-executing
constitutional provision does not necessarily give rise to a damages suit”). The Utah
Supreme Court had earlier ruled that a prison inmate could pursue a damage claim under
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two recent decisions, the California Supreme Court has similarly
adopted a more restrictive methodology for evaluating claims that
makes it much more difficult to assert a private cause of action to enforce
a constitutional tort.87 Its new multi-factor test looks first to evidence of
an “affirmative intent” in the constitution itself or accompanying
material to authorize or withhold money damages as a remedy. Finding
no such intent, it then examines several factors, such as the availability of
other remedies, the extent to which the provision is self-executing (a
judicially manageable tort), and the importance of the constitutional
right.88 The court found no action for damages for violation of either the
due process or free speech clauses of its constitution, reasoning that there
was no common law history from which it could infer an intent to
provide an action for damages and thus such was not available.89
It is noteworthy that neither California nor Utah has ruled out the
general principle that a private cause of action for damages may be
implied for some constitutional wrongdoing.90 It appears that only nine
states have flatly rejected such a cause of action.91 Nonetheless, the
restrictions that California and Utah have imposed will clearly
discourage injured plaintiffs from pursuing claims. There is no reason to
limit relief, as Utah does, to “flagrant violations” of the state constitution.
The egregiousness of the wrongdoing should affect the amount, not the

the state constitution for failure to diagnose or provide adequate medical care. Bott v.
Deland, 922 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah 1996).
87
Degrassi v. Cook, 29 Cal. 4th 333, 58 P.3d 360 (2002); Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 29 Cal. 4th 300, 58 P.3d 339 (2002).
88
Katzberg, 29 Cal. 4th at 323, 58 P.3d at 354.
89
Id.; see also Deirdre McInerney, Due Process—Money Damages Are Not Available As a
Means To Remedy a Violation of the Due Process Clause of the California Constitution, 35
RUTGERS L.J. 1443, 1459 (2004) (noting that the Katzberg decision indicates “a general
reluctance and apprehension” to recognize a monetary remedy that “may retard the
development and litigation of state civil rights”).
90
Degrassi, 29 Cal. 4th at 344, 58 P.3d at 367 (“This does not mean that the free speech
clause, in general, never will support an action for money damages.”). In Spackman, the
Utah Supreme Court did not overrule its holding in Bott. It simply held that not all selfexecuting rights give rise to a damage action. See supra note 86.
91
These states include Colorado, Bd. of County Comm’rs of Douglas County v. Sundheim,
926 P.2d 545, 548 (Colo. 1996); Hawaii, Figueroa v. State, 61 Haw. 369, 382–84, 604 P.2d 1198,
1206–07 (1980); Mississippi, City of Jackson v. Sutton, 797 So. 2d 977, 979 (Miss. 2001); Ohio,
Provens v. Stark County Bd. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 64 Ohio St. 3d 252, 260,
594 N.E.2d 959, 965 (1992); Oregon, Hunter v. City of Eugene, 309 Or. 298, 304, 787 P.2d 881,
884 (1990); North Dakota, Kouba v. State, 687 N.W.2d 466, 471–72 (N.D. 2004); Tennessee,
Lee v. Ladd, 834 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Texas, City of Beaumont v. Bouillion,
38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 282, 896 S.W.2d 143, 148 (1995); and Wyoming, Cooney v. Park County, 792
P.2d 1287, 1298 (Wyo. 1990).
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availability, of damages.92 Further, the California Supreme Court’s
recent mandate that the plaintiff demonstrate “affirmative intent” or else
be subject to a multi-factor test is based, in part, on a faulty reading of
Bivens.93 Finally, California has implemented specific civil rights
legislation, which permits a statutory claim for vindicating rights
violations, thus justifying a more wary approach when an “implied”
remedy is sought.94 It is true that other states have refused to adopt a
broad rule that all provisions of their state constitution necessarily give
rise to a damage action.95 Because Indiana has not yet recognized that
courts have the power to award damages to vindicate constitutional
wrongdoing, this Article addresses this threshold question as well as the
concerns that have led other states to deny a damage action.
In general, those states that have refused to recognize a damage
remedy under their constitutions have cited three primary concerns: (1)
separation of powers, (2) the inappropriateness of implying a private
cause of action when alternate remedies are available, and (3) sovereign
immunity. Each of these arguments will be addressed in the sections
that follow.
A. Separation of Powers
A core argument against recognizing a private cause of action for
damages is that this violates separation of powers and interferes with the

92
The Utah court cited to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity that is available
to government officials sued in their individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However,
to the extent plaintiffs seek to hold government entities, as opposed to individuals, liable
for their wrongdoing, the Supreme Court has specifically rejected any good faith defense.
See supra note 1.
93
The California Supreme Court purportedly relied on Bivens to ask whether other
factors indicated that it should create a monetary remedy. Katzberg, 29 Cal. 4th at 323–24, 58
P.3d at 354–55. In reality, the Court in Bivens asked whether there are factors that would
deny recognition of a monetary award. This author contends that the presumption should
be in favor of recognizing a monetary award, absent strong countervailing arguments.
Because state courts have inherent power to award damages for constitutional
wrongdoing, the burden should be on the government to dissuade the court from
exercising this power.
94
CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.1 (West 1987).
95
In addition to Utah and California, the Connecticut Supreme Court has stated that it
will not necessarily imply a constitutional cause of action for every type of violation, but
rather it explained that claims will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, looking to the
nature of the constitutional provision at issue, the unconstitutional conduct, and the nature
of the harm, as well as separation of powers considerations and other factors articulated in
Bivens and its progeny. Binette v. Sabo, 244 Conn. 23, 47–48, 710 A.2d 688, 700 (1998).
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legislature’s prerogative to resolve difficult questions of public policy.96
Some state courts have expressed the separation of powers concern as
raising the question of whether constitutional rights are “selfexecuting.”97 The term “self-executing” is not helpful because it only
means that the constitutional provision is sufficiently clear in setting
down principles so as to be judicially enforceable.98 Even if a
constitutional guarantee is clear, this does not necessarily trigger an
“implied” cause of action for damages. Nonetheless, it is helpful to
examine this question as a starting point for analysis.
Most provisions in Indiana’s Bill of Rights should be presumed to be
self-executing, in the sense that they are not merely horatory but rather
they impose duties and create rights. The Indiana Supreme Court has

See, e.g., Kelley Property Dev., Inc. v. Lebanon, 226 Conn. 314, 331–32, 627 A.2d 909,
918–19 (1993) (prohibiting suit by landowners challenging a zoning commission because
such would involve policy choices best left to those who exercise discretionary power);
Moody v. Hicks, 956 S.W.2d 398, 402 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (“Whether such a cause of action
should be permitted is best left to the discretion of the General Assembly.”); Provens v.
Stark County Bd. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 64 Ohio St. 3d 252, 254–55, 594
N.E.2d 959, 961–62 (1992) (holding that the legislature was the more appropriate body to
create remedies for constitutional violations, especially where other statutory or
administrative procedures provided meaningful remedies); City of Beaumont v. Bouillion,
38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 282, 896 S.W.2d 143, 149 (1995) (holding that absent express authority
from the legislature, it would not recognized an implied private cause of action for
damages under the free speech and free assembly protections of the Texas Constitution).
97
See Walinski v. Morrisson & Morrisson, 60 Ill. App. 3d 616, 619, 377 N.E.2d 242, 244
(1978) (“Since the right is explicitly made ‘enforceable without action by the General
Assembly,’ an aggrieved person should have recourse to existing judicial or legislative
remedies for a violation of a right.”); Brown v. State, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 185–86, 674 N.E.2d
1129, 1137–38 (1996) (holding that a civil damage remedy can be implied under the state
constitution when the provision is self-executing); Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761,
781, 413 S.E.2d 276, 289 (1992) (holding that because freedom of speech is self-executing, a
cause of action for damages lies); Shields v. Gerhart, 163 Vt. 219, 225–27, 658 A.2d 924, 929–
30 (1995) (holding that an implied cause of action is available with regard to constitutional
rights, such as freedom of speech, that are concrete and defined); cf. Bandoni v. State, 715
A.2d 580, 587 (R.I. 1998) (holding that the state’s recently enacted victims’ rights
amendment was not self-executing and thus did not give rise to a cause of action for a
constitutional tort).
98
See, e.g., Shields, 163 Vt. at 224, 658 A.2d at 928 (“A constitutional provision may be
said to be self-executing if it supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the right given
may be enjoyed and protected, . . . and it is not self-executing when it merely indicates
principles.”); see also THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 167–68
(8th ed. 1927) (“A constitutional provision may be said to be self-executing if it supplies a
sufficient rule by means of which the right given may be enjoyed and protected, or the
duty imposed may be enforced; and it is not self-executing when it merely indicates
principles, without laying down rules by means of which these principles may be given the
force of law.”).
96
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not ruled that any provision in the Indiana Bill of Rights is not selfexecuting in this sense, although in Doe v. O’Connor,99 the court
suggested in dicta that Article I, section 1, which broadly guarantees
natural rights, may not be self-executing, or at least that other states have
reached this conclusion regarding their similarly worded, open-ended
provisions that protect all “inalienable rights.”100 The Indiana Supreme
Court has, for a different reason, recognized one constitutional guarantee
that cannot be independently enforced by the judiciary. In In re
Zumbrun,101 the court reasoned that Article I, section 22 was not “selfexecuting” because the provision states that “the privilege of the debtor
to enjoy the necessary comforts of life shall be recognized by wholesome
laws, exempting a reasonable amount of property from seizure or sale for
the payment of any debt or liability . . . .”102 Because the text as well as
the legislative history specify the need for lawmaking power “to give it
active vitality,” the court’s conclusion is justified.103

Doe v. O’Connor, 790 N.E.2d 985 (Ind. 2003).
Id. at 991; see also Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (reasoning
that Article I, section 1 was really only a generalized policy statement by the framers of the
Indiana Constitution as to important principles that should guide governance of the state,
but that it lacked guidelines for uniform enforcement and thus should not be viewed as a
concrete right). This interpretation of Article I, section 1 seems contrary to early Indiana
Supreme Court decisions that invoked this provision to invalidate legislative enactments.
See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. In Clinic for Women, Inc. v. Brizzi, 814 N.E.2d
1042, 1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. granted, 831 N.E.2d 735 (Jan. 27, 2005), the appellate
court ruled, contrary to Morrisson, that Article I, section 1 encompasses a core value right to
privacy, which includes the decision of whether to terminate a pregnancy. Other states are
divided on this question. In addition to the cases cited in Doe, see State v. Williams, 88 Ohio
St. 3d 513, 523, 728 N.E.2d 342, 354 (2000) (holding that Ohio’s similar “fundamental rights”
provision was not a self-executing provision, but rather required enacting provisions to
indicate how these rights are subject to judicial enforcement); and Shields, 163 Vt. At 224–
25, 658 A.2d at 928–29 (1995) (holding that its Article I, which declares the existence of
“natural, inherent, and unalienable rights,” is not self-executing and “does not provide
rights to individuals that may be vindicated in a judicial action”). Cf. Peper v. Princeton
Univ. Bd. of Trs., 77 N.J. 55, 77–81, 389 A.2d 465, 476–78 (1978) (recognizing a direct cause
of action under the state’s natural rights guarantee on behalf of a female employee suing a
private university for sex discrimination); Hunter v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 277
Pa. Super. 4, 8–9, 419 A.2d 631, 633 (1980) (holding that an individual denied employment
because of a fourteen-year-old assault conviction, for which he received unconditional
pardon, could bring a cause of action directly under Pennsylvania’s natural rights
provision, citing earlier state law indicating that the clause needs no affirmative legislation,
civil or criminal, for its enforcement in the civil courts).
101
626 N.E.2d 452 (Ind. 1993).
102
IND. CONST., art. I, § 22 (emphasis added).
103
Warren v. Ind. Telephone Co., 626 N.E.2d at 55; see also Leger v. Stockton Unified Sch.
Dist., 202 Cal. App. 3d 1448, 1456, 249 Cal. Rptr. 688, 691–92 (1988) (holding that its
constitutional amendment declaring an inalienable right to attend safe schools was not selfexecuting “in the sense of supplying a right to sue for damages,” but was meant to serve
99

100
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Aside from these cases, separation of powers should not keep
Indiana courts from exercising their inherent power to enforce the state
constitution. During the Debates of 1850, a deep concern was expressed
regarding the General Assembly’s practice of usurping the role of the
judiciary by actually adjudicating claims against the state. Mr. Kelso
stated: “I maintain that everything of a judicial character should be kept
from the Legislature—our courts of justice being a separate and distinct
part of the government.”104 Mr. Reed similarly asserted that “the
determination of legal rights appropriately belongs to the courts and not
to the Legislature”; the legislature “is the wrong department of
government for determining questions of right.”105 Mr. Clark added: “It
appears to me that a court of justice is a much more suitable tribunal to
investigate claims against the State, than the Legislature.”106 These
comments acknowledge that the framers intended for the protection of
rights to be a judicial task, and they deeply resented the legislature’s
usurpation of this power. In light of the history surrounding Article IV,
sections 22, 23, and 24, which targeted the General Assembly’s
unscrupulous practice of enacting special laws, it is highly unlikely that
the framers would have entrusted the preservation of rights exclusively
to the General Assembly.107
Early case precedent reflects this same understanding of separation
of powers. In 1897, the Indiana Supreme Court reasoned that: “The
great weight of authority is to the effect that a constitutional provision
like the one here in question is self-executing, and needs no legislative
enactment to carry it into effect and operation.”108 Similarly, the Indiana
Supreme Court, in Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co.,109 ruled that “[w]here
a self-executing constitutional right is violated, no statutory remedy is
necessary for its protection.”110 The court explained that the open court’s
only as a directive to the legislature to pass other measures); Lucas v. McAfee, 217 Ind. 534,
29 N.E.2d 588 (Ind. 1940) (holding that Article 2, section 8, which provides that “the
General Assembly shall have power to deprive of the right of suffrage, and to render
ineligible, any person convicted of an infamous crime,” is not self-executing but rather
authorizes the legislature to enact laws regarding the franchise).
104
DEBATES, supra note 20, at 1275.
105
Id. at 1283.
106
Id.
107
See further discussion infra Part III.C.
108
Carroll v. Green, 148 Ind. 362, 364, 47 N.E. 223, 224 (1897) (holding that Article II,
section 6, which prohibits an individual who has offered or accepted a bribe from holding
office, is self-executing and therefore did not require legislative definition to enforce in an
election contest).
109
217 Ind. 93, 26 N.E.2d 399 (1940).
110
Id. at 114, 26 N.E.2d at 407; see also Harris v. Town of Ogden Dunes, 551 N.E. 2d 1147,
1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (citing to Warren).
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provision of Article I, section 12 and the right of trial by jury guaranteed
by section 20 reflect the “fundamental law of the state, declared by the
people themselves acting in their sovereign capacity,” and thus such
rights must be strictly protected. More specifically, the court held that
the right to a jury trial “is self-executing and will be enforced
independent of statutory enactment.”111 These cases suggest that as long
as a state constitutional right is sufficiently clear and defined and does
not expressly mandate legislative action, it should be considered selfexecuting and enforceable by the judiciary.112
In Bivens, the United States Supreme Court squarely rejected the
separation of powers argument as a limitation on judicial power to
enforce federal constitutional rights. Justice Black contended, in a
dissenting opinion, that fashioning a cause of action for damages was a
usurpation of legislative power that is both unwarranted and unwise:
“The task of evaluating the pros and cons of creating judicial remedies
for particular wrongs is a matter for Congress and the legislatures of the
states.”113 The majority disagreed. Justice Harlan framed the core
question as whether the power to authorize damages for the vindication
of a constitutional right was placed by the Constitution exclusively in
Congress’ hands.114 He explained that, although nothing in the text or
the debates directly answered this question, the understanding of the
time, which linked rights to remedies, revealed that the right to pursue
damages stemmed from the Constitution itself and was inherent in
judicial power.115 Further, he noted that the assessment of damages
cannot be inherently legislative because courts have awarded damages
111
Warren, 217 Ind. at 102, 26 N.E.2d at 403; see also Knight & Jillson Co. v. Miller, 172 Ind.
27, 36, 87 N.E. 823, 827 (1909) (noting that “[w]hen a constitutional provision or a statute is
declarative of the common law, it is self-active”).
112
Several state courts have ruled that the judiciary has the power to enforce
constitutional rights even in the absence of implementing legislation. See, e.g., Peper v.
Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trs., 77 N.J. 55, 77, 389 A.2d 465, 476 (1978) (“[J]ust as the Legislature
cannot abridge constitutional rights by its enactments, it cannot curtail them through its
silence, and the judicial obligation to protect the fundamental rights of individuals is as old
as this country.”); Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 781–82, 413 S.E.2d 276, 289–90
(1992) (determining that the right of free speech in its constitution is “self-executing” and,
because the common law provides a remedy for every wrong, it permits a damage action to
adequately redress violation of that right).
113
Bivens v. Six Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 429 (1977)
(Black, J., dissenting).
114
Id. at 401 (Harlan, J., concurring).
115
Id. at 402. He realized the problem of giving the Legislature this authority in light of
the judiciary’s role “to vindicate social policies which, by virtue of their inclusion in the
Constitution, are aimed predominantly at restraining the Government as an instrument of
the popular will.” Id. at 404.
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to effectuate congressional policy where statutory rights are involved
and because a court’s inherent equitable powers were broad enough to
include the right to award damages where necessary.116 Finally, he
asserted that “courts of law are capable of making the types of judgment
concerning causation and magnitude of injury necessary to accord
meaningful compensation for invasion of Fourth Amendment rights.”117
Similarly, Indiana courts have the inherent power, duty, and capability
to make principled choices among traditional judicial remedies,
including damages.118
The United States Supreme Court has not only rejected separation of
powers as an obstacle to a judicial remedy for constitutional wrongdoing, but has also expressed grave concern for legislative action that
interferes with the judiciary’s inherent power to adjudicate constitutional
claims. In Smith v. Robinson,119 it explained that “[e]ven if Congress
repealed all statutory remedies for constitutional violations, the power of
federal courts to grant the relief necessary to protect against
constitutional deprivations or to remedy the wrong done is presumed to
be available in cases within their jurisdiction.”120 Further, in Legal
Services Corp. v. Velazquez,121 it invalidated a restriction prohibiting legal
services attorneys from receiving federal funds if their representation
involved an effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing welfare
laws. In finding this proscription unconstitutional, Justice Kennedy
opined that this restriction on attorney representation impermissibly
intruded into the “primary mission of the judiciary,” which is to
interpret the law and the Constitution.122 He argued that the restriction
“threatens severe impairment of the judicial function because it insulates
laws presenting constitutional challenges from judicial inquiry.”123
Justice Kennedy warned that “we must be vigilant when Congress
imposes rules and conditions which in effect insulate its own laws from
legitimate judicial challenge.”124 The refusal of state courts to hear state

Id.
Id.
118
As noted, Indiana courts have long used injunctions to remedy constitutional
violations without enabling legislation, and the issuance of an injunction involves the same
sensitive balance of interests as would be required in making a damage award. See supra
notes 66–70 and accompanying text.
119
468 U.S. 992 (1993).
120
Id. at 1012 n.15.
121
531 U.S. 533 (2001).
122
Id. at 545.
123
Id. at 546.
124
Id. at 548.
116
117
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constitutional claims should similarly be viewed as an abdication of
judicial responsibility, not a violation of separation of powers.
A few states have enacted specific remedies for the violation of state
constitutional rights,125 but until the Indiana General Assembly sees fit to
do so, the Indiana Supreme Court should exercise its inherent power to
ensure that Indiana citizens have a full and complete remedy for
constitutional wrongdoing, as guaranteed by Article I, section 12. The
majority in Bivens flatly rejected the notion that the framers of the
Federal Constitution intended to confer power to authorize damages for
vindication of constitutional rights exclusively in Congress’ hands.126 To
depend on the majority to enact enabling legislation, when the Bill of
Rights was specifically designed to limit majority rule, is counterintuitive.127 Similarly, the framers of the Indiana Constitution sought a
limited government and the protection of core constitutional values.128
They could not have believed that the redressibility for violation of core
values should depend exclusively on the willingness of the General
Assembly to adopt a specific cause of action for damages. Indeed,
statements made during the Debates of 1850 acknowledged that the
Indiana Constitution itself provided the source for judicial authority to
act if the General Assembly failed to pass laws allowing suit against the
state.129 Much of the discussion in 1850 focused on holding the state
responsible for its contractual obligations.130 However, if the framers
were this concerned about the state’s duty to honor its contracts, it is
implausible to believe that they would have allowed the state to escape
monetary liability for breaches of Indiana’s Bill of Rights, the state’s
fundamental law, simply because the General Assembly had not acted.
B. The Existence of Alternate Remedies
Several state courts have dismissed constitutional damage claims
where the plaintiffs already had access to a state contract claim, an
125
As of 1998, four states had done so: Arkansas, Maine, Nebraska, and South Carolina.
See Donoghue & Edelstein, supra note 84.
126
Bivens v. Six Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1977)
(reasoning that absent an “explicit congressional declaration” that injured persons may not
recover damages but must utilize a different “equally effective” congressional remedy,
courts may award damages).
127
Id. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[A]t the very least, it strikes me as no more
appropriate to await express congressional authorization of traditional judicial relief with
regard to these legal interest than with respect to interests protected by federal statutes.”).
128
See discussion supra Part II.
129
See DEBATES, supra note 20 and accompanying text.
130
See infra Part III.C.
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administrative remedial scheme, or a tort action.131 At least one state
court has even ruled that the existence of prospective equitable relief
defeats the right to a damage remedy.132 Some of these courts have
relied upon the statements in Bivens that a private cause of action may be
unavailable where Congress has provided its own “equally effective”
remedy.133 Others have cited to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 874A,
and its commentary, which make the availability of existing remedies an

131
See, e.g., Thomas v. Hickel, 947 P.2d 816, 824 (Alaska 1997) (holding that because a
private tort action could be maintained for some of the conduct abridging plaintiff’s
speech, “a direct constitutional remedy would be superfluous”); State v. Haley, 687 P.2d
305, 317–18 (Alaska 1984) (holding that the existence of a contract remedy defeats the
claim); Bd. of County Comm’rs of Douglas County v. Sundheim, 926 P.2d 545, 553 (Colo.
1996) (en banc) (“While it may be appropriate to recognize an implied state constitutional
cause of action when there is no other adequate remedy, we agree with the approach taken
by [Connecticut] that where other adequate remedies exist, no implied remedy is
necessary.”); Kelley Property Dev., Inc. v. Town of Lebanon, 226 Conn. 314, 338–39, 627
A.2d 909, 922 (1993) (holding that judicial deference to legislative resolution of public
policy mandates that courts not imply damage actions when the legislature has provided a
reasonably adequate statutory remedy); Jones v. Powell, 462 Mich. 329, 612 N.W.2d 423
(2000) (holding that, because plaintiff could sue for false arrest and imprisonment, assault
and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, as well as for the deprivation of
federal civil rights under § 1983, it would not infer a damage remedy for state
constitutional rights); Robertson v. City of High Point, 129 N.C. App. 88, 92, 497 S.E.2d 300,
303 (1998) (holding that, although North Carolina generally recognizes a right of action to
sue under its constitution, a takings claim was not actionable because state law provided an
adequate remedy by affording compensation for a total or partial taking of real property
interests); Shields v. Gerhart, 163 Vt. 219, 237, 658 A.2d 924, 936 (1995) (holding that the
existence of an alternative, adequate remedy for invasion of plaintiff’s interests under an
existing administrative scheme defeats a private action for damages for denial of her
operating license); see also Jefferson, supra note 58, at 1543 (listing cases involving
employment disputes and discrimination, contract bidding, licensing and zoning
determinations, and dissemination of private information, wherein state courts have
refused to recognize a direct cause of action under the state constitution because of the
availability of alternative remedies).
132
See 77th Dist. Judge v. Michigan, 175 Mich. App. 681, 438 N.W.2d 333 (1989); cf.
Moresy v. State ex rel Dep’t of Wildlife and Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1091–93 (La. 1990)
(“Recovery of damages is the only realistic remedy for a person deprived of his right to be
free from unreasonable searches or seizures. Rarely will he be able to obviate the harm by
securing injunctive relief from any court.”); Brown v. State, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 192, 674 N.E.2d
1129, 1141 (1996) (arguing that injunctive and declaratory relief are insufficient and that
damages may be necessary to deter government misconduct).
133
Bivens v. Six Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1977);
see also Brown v. Ely, 14 P.3d 257, 261 (Alaska 2000) (declining to recognize a private cause
of action to vindicate state constitutional rights where the litigant has another remedy,
noting that “federal courts have not permitted the Bivens remedy where alternative
remedies are available”).
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important factor in deciding whether to recognize an implied damage
remedy.134
The existence of a tort remedy is most often cited as the basis for
denying an implied damage remedy under the state constitution. In
Bivens, the Supreme Court provided sound reasons for rejecting the
notion that a cause of action for vindicating constitutional claims should
be refused simply because a tort action may be available. The Court
explained that a constitutional tort is different in kind and much more
dangerous than a negligence tort:
“An agent acting—albeit
unconstitutionally—in the name of the United States possesses a far
greater capacity for harm than an individual trespasser exercising no
authority other than his own.”135 Further, the Court reasoned that the
protection of constitutional rights should not be tied to the “niceties of
local trespass laws.”136
Many state courts have similarly reasoned that the availability of tort
remedies should not, without more, defeat a constitutional claim. The
Connecticut Supreme Court, for example, has explained that restricting
plaintiffs to common-law remedies would require the court “to ignore
the important distinction between the tortious misconduct of one private
citizen toward another, on the one hand, and the violation of a citizen’s
constitutional rights by a police officer, on the other.”137 Courts in New
York and Maryland have reached this same conclusion.138
Based on this analysis, it should be irrelevant whether a
nonconstitutional tort remedy is available under the Indiana Tort Claims
Act. First, it is clear that not all constitutional wrongdoing can be
134
Comments to the Restatement list the following factors to be considered: (1) the
adequacy of existing remedies; (2) the degree to which establishing a constitutional tort
would alter current tort law; and (3) the nature and purpose of the provision.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A, cmt. H (1979).
135
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392.
136
Id. at 394; see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 12, 23 (1980) (holding that plaintiff could
sue directly under the Eighth Amendment despite the fact that he had other remedies,
including actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act).
137
Binette v. Sabo, 710 A.2d 688, 699 (Conn. 1998).
138
See Widgeon v. E. Shore Hosp. Ctr., 300 Md. 520, 533, 479 A.2d 921, 928 (1984)
(holding that alternative remedies under the Federal Constitution and Maryland’s nonconstitutional tort law do not render a constitutional damage claim inappropriate); Brown,
89 N.Y.2d at 192–93, 674 N.E.2d at 1140–41 (rejecting the argument that plaintiffs should be
limited to common law torts because the duties imposed upon government by the state
constitution are far more serious than the private wrongs regulated by the common law
and because the existence of a remedy should not depend upon whether the “complaint fits
within the framework of a common law tort”).
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characterized as a tort. Claims that the state is not paying for certain
medically necessary abortions139 or that a township has forced the
homeless into religious mission shelters that required them to attend
religious services140 or that local government has refused to pay
appointed counsel for services rendered141 cannot be pigeon-holed into
any existing tort, but they nonetheless deserve a remedy. Second, even if
some constitutional violations can be crafted as traditionally recognized
torts, Indiana’s Act provides inadequate protection. It generally does not
allow claims against law enforcement officers, who comprise one of the
largest groups of defendants charged with constitutional wrongdoing,
and it is filled with exceptions, such as broad immunity for the
performance of a discretionary function.142 The Act also includes
stringent notice requirements as well as damage caps.143 The experience
in other states is that when constitutional wrongdoing is enforceable
only under, or is subject to, the state’s tort law, the plaintiff often loses.144
Although the Indiana Civil Rights Act provides an avenue for relief
in certain cases, it too should not be viewed as a preclusive alternative.
The Act allows the Civil Rights Commission to enforce only violations of
statutory rights set forth in that Act, not constitutional rights.145 Finally,
139
Humphries v. Clinic for Women, 796 N.E.2d 247 (Ind. 2003). See supra note 70 for a
discussion of this case.
140
Ctr. Twp. Tr. v. Coe, 572 N.E.2d 1350 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
141
Sholes v. Sholes, 760 N.E.2d 156 (Ind. 2001).
142
IND. CODE § 34-13-3-3 (2004).
143
IND. CODE §§ 34-13-3-4, 34-13-3-6 (2004). Some states that have recognized state
claims have required that constitutional claimants comply with such “notice of claim”
requirements in the states’ tort claims acts. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 179
N.J. Super. 496, 511, 432 A.2d 572, 580 (1981).
144
See, e.g., Norton v. Hall, 834 A.2d 928, 931 (Me. 2003) (holding that state constitutional
claims were barred by the discretionary function immunity provisions of the Maine Tort
Claims Act); Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 266–68, 863 A.2d 297, 311–12 (2004) (holding that
state police officers classified as state personnel enjoyed qualified immunity under the tort
claims law and thus liability could not be imposed absent proof of malice); Mack v. City of
Detroit, 467 Mich. 186, 189, 649 N.W. 2d 47, 49–50 (2002) (holding that even if plaintiff had
a constitutional claim against the city for sexual orientation discrimination, because “such a
cause of action would contravene the governmental tort liability act,” it declined to
recognize the cause of action); City of Jackson v. Sutton, 797 So. 2d 977, 980 (Miss. 2001)
(holding that the Mississippi Tort Claims Act was the exclusive remedy for filing suit
against a government entity for monetary relief and that the Act immunized both
defendants from liability, and explaining further that claims outside the Tort Claims Act
were limited to declaratory actions and not claims involving money damages); see also
Christina B. Whitman, Emphasizing the Constitutional in Constitutional Torts, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 661, 686 (1997) (“It is dangerous to define constitutional claims as a narrow subset of
tort law because tort law has been particularly ineffective in dealing with precisely the sorts
of interests and injuries that are at the center of constitutional law.”).
145
Indiana Civil Rights Act, IND. CODE § 22-9-1-1 (2004).
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the availability of relief under § 1983 for federal constitutional
wrongdoing should not defeat the independent significance of state
constitutional rights and the need to vindicate deprivation of such rights.
Certainly the framers of the Indiana Constitution intended the carefully
crafted bill of rights to be supplemental to any rights available and
enforceable under the Federal Constitution. Even those courts that have
relied on the existence of alternative state remedies to defeat
constitutional claims have accepted this notion.146 More broadly,
because state courts have inherent power to create remedies as well as
the duty to enforce constitutional protections, they should not abdicate
this power simply because the legislature has enacted remedial laws for
other types of wrongdoing.147

146
See, e.g., Katzberg v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 586, 594 (Ct. App.
2001) (“We do not understand how a federal remedy serves to vindicate a state
constitutional violation.”).
147
Although the existence of alternative remedies should not be viewed as foreclosing
recognition of a judicial cause of action, there may be special instances where exhaustion of
an administrative remedy may be required. For example, in Young v. Indiana Department of
Natural Resources, 789 N.E.2d 550 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), a former employee sued the state
Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) alleging that he was terminated in retaliation
for exercising his constitutional right to free speech. The court reasoned that the
employee’s failure to exhaust administrative proceedings specifically created for DNR
employees divested the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over his state constitutional
law claims. The court cited to an earlier Indiana Supreme Court decision, Turner v. City of
Evansville, 740 N.E.2d 860 (Ind. 2001), where the Indiana Supreme Court held that even if a
complaint challenged the constitutionality of a statute that might be beyond the agency’s
power to resolve, “exhaustion may still be required because administrative action may
resolve the case on other grounds without confronting broader legal issues.” Id. at 862
(citations omitted); see also Abner v. Dep’t of Health of Ind., 777 N.E.2d 778, 785 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2002) (holding that judicial review of a complaint against the state seeking to recover
unpaid overtime compensation is available only “after exhausting all administrative
remedies available within the agency whose action is being challenged and within any
other agency authorized to exercise administrative review”), trans. denied, 792 N.E.2d 38
(Ind. Feb. 20, 2003).
On the other hand, in Turner, the Indiana Supreme Court noted that exhaustion would
not be required “where pursuit of administrative remedies would be futile, or where strict
compliance would cause irreparable harm, or where the applicable statute is alleged to be
void on its face.” Turner, 740 N.E.2d at 862 n.1. Further, the court earlier ruled that
exhaustion of administrative remedies would not be required where the litigant challenges
the constitutionality of procedures rather than the denial of an individual claim for
benefits. Wilson v. Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 270 Ind. 302, 385 N.E.2d 438 (1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 874 (1979). The court reasoned that the rule requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies “should not be applied mechanistically . . . . In the present case
the question presented is of constitutional character. With all due respect, we think that the
resolution of such a purely legal issue is beyond the expertise of the Division’s
administrative channels and is thus a subject more appropriate for judicial consideration.”
Id. at 305, 385 N.E.2d at 441.
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C. Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity imposes one of the most difficult obstacles to
recognizing a private cause of action against the state. State courts are
deeply divided as to whether, and the extent to which, sovereign
immunity prohibits damage claims for constitutional wrongdoing. Some
states have viewed sovereign immunity as an absolute bar to damage
claims,148 whereas others have ruled that it does not affect constitutional
claims.149 A few state courts have held that plaintiffs cannot avail
themselves of the waiver of sovereign immunity in their state tort
statutes,150 whereas others have relied on statutory waiver to impose
respondeat superior liability for constitutional wrongdoing.151 Professor
148
See State Bd. of Educ. v. Drury, 263 Ga. 429, 433–35, 437 S.E.2d 290, 294–95 (1993)
(“[U]nless and until there is a waiver of the doctrine of sovereign immunity . . . the
judiciary is compelled to hold that the victims of such state rules and regulations have no
viable state claim for damages and that they must be relegated to the express remedies
which do exist, such as initiation of a declaratory judgment action.”); Prager v. State Dep’t
of Revenue, 271 Kan. 1, 20 P.3d 39 (2001) (holding that sovereign immunity would bar any
claim against the State and the Kansas Tort Claims Act did not eliminate immunity for
constitutional torts); Ritchie v. Donnelly, 324 Md. 344, 369, 597 A.2d 432, 444 (1991)
(holding that, although state officers who violate rights may be sued for damages, the State
itself enjoys sovereign immunity); Murphy v. State, 248 Mont. 82, 86, 809 P.2d 16, 19 (1991)
(holding that the State did not waive sovereign immunity through the purchase of an
insurance policy and thus that no action could exist); Kouba v. State, 687 N.W.2d 466, 471
(N.D. 2004) (holding that no private action exists under the state constitution for asserting
this claim against the State); Livengood v. Meece, 477 N.W.2d 183, 190 (N.D. 1991) (holding
that sovereign immunity bars state constitutional claims).
149
See, e.g., Moresi v. State, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1093 (La. 1990) (holding that “damages may
be obtained by an individual for injuries or loss caused by a violation” of the state
constitution, although affording officers qualified immunity); Smith v. Dep’t of Pub.
Health, 428 Mich. 540, 639–40, 410 N.W.2d 749, 793–94 (1987) (holding that sovereign
immunity “loses its vitality when faced with unconstitutional acts of the state”); Brown v.
State, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 195, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1143 (1996) (concluding that the State had
waived its sovereign immunity from all types of tort actions); Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330
N.C. 761, 785, 413 S.E.2d 276, 291 (1992) (holding that common law sovereign immunity
does not bar suit against the state for constitutional wrongdoing).
150
Garcia v. Reyes, 697 So. 2d 549, 551 (Fla. Ct. App. 1997) (ruling that, although the state
has waived its immunity from ordinary torts, it has never waived immunity with regard to
constitutional torts); Figueroa v. State, 61 Haw. 369, 380–82, 604 P.2d 1198, 1205–06 (1970)
(holding that although the Hawaii State Tort Liability Act waived immunity of the State for
the torts of its employees, this included only waiver regarding traditionally recognized
common law torts and not “novel liabilities,” such as state constitutional violations); cf. Bott
v. Deland, 922 P.2d 732, 736 (Utah 1996) (holding that statutory immunity does not insulate
constitutionally-based damages, nor can an award be subject to the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act section imposing caps for personal injury damages against state officials; the
court reasoned that it would violate plaintiff’s constitutional right to be free of
“unnecessary rigor” to reduce the damage award).
151
See DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 46–48, 729 A.2d 354, 369–70 (1999) (holding that local
government entities have respondeat superior liability for civil damages resulting from state
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Friesen asserts that state sovereignty has come under heavy attack in
state courts and that most states have abolished or severely limited this
doctrine.152 Indeed, she cites the report of the National Association of
Attorneys General, asserting that thirty-four states have enacted
legislation consenting to “more than minimal” state liability.153
Before addressing this question in light of Indiana’s history, it should
be noted that sovereign immunity, as understood under the common
law, restricts only damage actions brought against the state itself. It does
not restrict claims brought against cities or counties. The United States
Supreme Court has explained that immunity for municipalities has no
roots in the English law and, in fact, was specifically rejected by English
courts.154 Political subdivisions were regularly sued for damages in
federal and state courts without objection at the time the Indiana
Constitution was adopted.155 Further, in the 1890 decision of Lincoln
County v. Luning,156 the Supreme Court announced that the record was
“full of suits” against counties without any mention of any type of
immunity.157 Second, sovereign immunity does not foreclose suit against
individual state officials. It was this distinction that allowed the
Supreme Court in Bivens to recognize an implied damage action against
constitutional violations committed by their agents and employees within the scope of the
employment); Lloyd v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 179 N.J. Super. 496, 511, 432 A.2d 572, 580
(Ch. Div. 1981) (holding that state constitutional torts should be brought under and are
governed by the New Jersey Tort Claims Act); Smialek v. Begay, 104 N.M. 375, 721 P.2d
1306 (1986) (holding that state constitutional claims are torts subject to the liabilities and
immunities set out in the state tort claims act); Begay v. State, 104 N.M. 483, 488, 723 P.2d
252, 257 (Ct. App. 1985), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Smialek v. Begay, 104 N.M. 375, 721
P.2d 1306 (1986); Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 180, 674 N.E.2d at 1134 (holding that the waiver in
state law for claims of breach of contract and torts also permits application of the rule of
respondeat superior to constitutional wrongdoing).
152
FRIESEN, supra note 40, § 8-3(b), at 8–12.
153
Id. (citing NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN., SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: THE TORT LIABILITY OF
GOVERNMENT AND ITS OFFICIALS 17 (1979)).
154
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 639 (1980).
155
Id. at 640 n.19 (listing several early decisions in which damages were imposed against
municipalities for federal statutory and constitutional violations as well as for breach of
contract); see also Rosalie B. Levinson, Suing Political Subdivisions in Federal Court: From
Edelman to Owen, 11 TOL. L. REV. 829, 851 n.126 (1980) (citing additional cases). But see
Jones v. Powell, 462 Mich. 329, 337, 612 N.W.2d 423, 427 (2000) (ruling that damage claims
may not be brought against municipalities or individual government employees because
cities may be sued under § 1983 to redress a violation of a federal constitutional right, and
suits may be brought against individual defendants both under § 1983 and common-law
tort theories, thus eliminating the need for such a remedy).
156
133 U.S. 529 (1890).
157
Although by the late nineteenth century some states began to confer sovereign
immunity upon municipalities, this applied only to tortious conduct but not constitutional
violations. See Levinson, supra note 155, at 852–53.
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federal officials who violate the Constitution without discussing the
doctrine.158
Further, during the 1850 Debates on the Indiana
Constitution, even those who favored greater protection for the state
itself recognized that the doctrine did not insulate individual
government officials.159 Third, sovereign immunity has never posed an
absolute bar to suing the state in Indiana. As discussed in Part II, courts
of equity have long entertained suits seeking to enjoin unconstitutional
action.160
As to the question of sovereign immunity from damages for the state
itself, in State v. Rendleman,161 the Indiana Supreme Court noted that
“[s]overeign immunity has long been recognized in Indiana,”162 but this
statement of Indiana’s history is woefully incomplete and misleading.
The court correctly explained that, prior to the adoption of the 1851
Constitution, it was well recognized that a claim could be brought
against the state only if the legislature authorized a particular individual
to bring suit.163 The prevailing practice at the time compelled litigants
who had contracted with the state to bring their case before the General
Assembly for purposes of securing a statutory enactment allowing suit
against the state. The Debates of 1850 reflect two serious concerns with
this practice. First, it meant that favoritism was extended to those
individuals who had the power or skill to effectively lobby the General
Assembly.164 Second, a core concern was that the General Assembly was
See discussion of F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, supra note 49.
Mr. Rariden urged that liability should be imposed on individuals and not the
sovereign: “It is its spokesman and actors [who do wrong]; and it is they that are and
ought to be responsible for wrongs inflicted, or rights withheld in its name . . . .” DEBATES,
supra note 20, at 1282.
160
See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text.
161
603 N.E.2d 1333 (Ind. 1992).
162
Id. at 1335; see also Boczar v. Kingen, No. IP99-0141-C-T/G, 2000 WL 1137713 (S.D. Ind.
2000) (reasoning that because the framers of the state constitution understood common law
sovereign immunity as precluding damage actions, they would not have intended to allow
an implied private cause of action against the state); Perkins v. State, 252 Ind. 549, 552, 251
N.E.2d 30, 32 (1969) (asserting that the drafters of the 1851 Constitution implicitly
recognized sovereign immunity). Further, the Indiana Supreme Court has specifically
rejected the notion that Article I, section 12, which guarantees a remedy by due course of
law for injury to persons or property, should be read as an implicit abrogation of sovereign
immunity. Dep’t of Conservation v. Pulaski Cir. Ct., 231 Ind. 245, 250, 108 N.E.2d 185, 187
(1952); City of Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Water Co., 185 Ind. 277, 290–91, 113 N.E. 369,
373 (1916); State v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 175 Ind. 59, 71, 93 N.E. 213, 218 (1910).
163
Rendleman, 603 N.E.2d at 1335.
164
Mr. Howe proclaimed that “all disputed claims against the State had been subjected to
the mercy of the General Assembly . . . .” DEBATES, supra note 20, at 1279. He asserted that
“[u]nless we adopt a provision of this sort [allowing for suit against the state], we strike at
the very root of the right of the citizen to be protected in his property.” Id. at 1274. Mr.
158
159
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usurping the judicial role by actually determining the merits of a case
because it was acknowledged that whenever such a law was passed, the
state was held liable.165 Mr. Kelso complained that the General
Assembly was acting as a “judicial tribunal for the determination of
claims against the state”166 and that “[t]he Legislature in regard to those
claims acts in a judicial capacity, although they are not authorized so to
act.”167
The debate culminated in the adoption of Article IV, section 24:
“Provision may be made, by general law, for bringing suit against the
state; but no special law authorizing such suit to be brought, or making
compensation to any person claiming damages against the state, shall
ever be passed.” The context in which this provision was adopted
reveals that the goal was to stop the General Assembly from passing
laws on behalf of particular claimants, not to preserve sovereign
immunity. To the contrary, the drafters of the constitution referred to
sovereign immunity as an “antiquated,” “absurd” doctrine that should
not survive adoption of the state constitution.168 The prevailing view
was that the sovereign should be accountable for wrongdoing just like
anyone else.169 Mr. Howe asserted:

Kelso explained that the purpose of Article IV, section 24 was to ensure that all individuals
who consider themselves aggrieved by the action of the state may have a hearing in a court
of justice. Id. at 1281.
165
Mr. Holman remarked that there had been “no instance in which a special act of the
Legislature has been passed granting to an individual the right to sue the State, in which
such individual has not recovered.” Id. at 1285. Further, he opined that the amount of the
judgment against the state was often “much beyond the justice of the claim.” Id.
166
Id. at 1274.
167
Id. at 1281.
168
Mr. Howe referred to sovereign immunity as the “antiquated objection” that allowing
suit would be “derogatory to the dignity of the state.” Id. at 1279. He subsequently
alluded “to the absurd doctrine that it is derogatory to the dignity of the sovereign to be
sued.” He stated that in this country “the only sovereign is the people.” Id. at 1280. Mr.
Reed noted that the doctrine was advocated “before the sovereign people themselves” who
determined that liability should be the rule. He explained: “The true and safe principle is,
that the State should be entitled to the same legal rights, and held to the same mode of
determining its legal obligations as individuals.” Id. at 1283; see also Vicki C. Jackson, The
Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 80
(1998) (“[T]he common law doctrine was founded on a notion that sovereignty resides in
the person of the monarch, whereas the premise of the Constitution was that sovereignty
derived from the people and the government created under the constitution was subject to
that written law.”).
169
Mr. Howe argued there was “no just distinction between the sovereign and the subject
in respect to the obligation to do justice.” DEBATES, supra note 20, at 1279. Mr. Kelso
explained that the doctrine of sovereignty “furnishes no good nor even plausible reason
why the State should not be held in a strict accountability for her contracts and
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[I]f public sentiment has progressed at all since the
adoption of our present constitution, it must certainly
have progressed so far as to see the necessity of
providing for awarding complete justice to individuals
in all cases of this kind, without fraud or delay—for of
what use or benefit is government, unless it is to carry
out to the highest practical point of development, the
fundamental principles of protection to life, liberty, and
property?170
The question was not whether the sovereign should be liable, but rather
the best way to address claims brought against the state. Amendments
were proposed that would have allowed a board to initially determine
such claims with an appeal to the Supreme Court, but, when the framers
could not agree on a procedure, they decided to leave it to the General
Assembly to work out the details.171 Although one of the drafters feared
the financial consequences of allowing suit against the state for breach of
contract, his concern was assuaged by the assurance that the state would
be liable only for breaches of future contracts.172
In light of this history, it is wrong to imply that the framers intended
to disallow suit against the state absent legislative action. This is a
particularly fallacious interpretation in light of the clearly voiced concern
that liability questions needed to be returned to the courts and taken
away from the General Assembly.173 A recurring theme throughout the
debates was the importance of having the judiciary determine legal

undertakings . . . she may be sued and forced to fulfill such contracts as individuals are
compelled to do.” Id. at 1282.
170
Id. at 1279–80.
171
Mr. Howe proposed the creation of a Board of Claims that would adjudicate
complaints against the state, followed by an appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court. Id. at
1274. When this suggestion was rejected, he conceded: “I am prepared to sanction the
principle that the State is sueable [sic] in every Circuit Court in the State, leaving the details
as to the bringing and conducting of those suits, to the Legislature. Where the sovereignty
commits an injury upon the subject let it be liable for that injury.” Id. at 1280. Mr. Reed
also explained that this section simply directed the General Assembly to decide “in what
manner, and in what courts, suits may be brought against the State.” Id. at 1283.
172
Mr. Borden was concerned that claims by current bondholders would bankrupt the
state, but Mr. Graham reassured him that the provision would operate prospectively only.
Further, Mr. Howe noted that because jurors understand that their taxes will pay for any
judgment, there is less concern that extravagant awards will be assessed against the state.
Id. at 1281.
173
Id. at 1275. Mr. Graham noted that the “object was to place the matter beyond the
power of the Legislature, at the same time to give it to the courts of justice . . . . [S]uch
matters should be decided by a court, and not by the Legislature.”

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol40/iss1/1

Levinson: Recognizing a Damage Remedy to Enforce Indiana's Bill of Rights

2005]

Recognizing a Damage Remedy

37

rights, not only with regard to contract claims but for “all claims,”
including “outrages” upon the rights of individuals.174 There was never
any notion that the General Assembly would have exclusive power on
this subject. Indeed, Mr. Howe, who proposed this provision, clearly
stated that “if the Legislature neglects to carry out the details, the
Constitution will itself afford the remedy.”175 In explaining the general
purposes of the provision, Mr. Holman specifically noted that one was
“the recognition of the general principle by which a sovereign State in
her sovereign capacity shall become subject to the just claims of the
citizens.”176 Thus, rather than codifying a rule of sovereignty, the very
purpose of Article IV, section 24 was to bury the ancient doctrine and to
ensure that courts, and not the General Assembly, would be adjudicating
claims of rights.177
The principle that sovereign immunity could be waived by the
courts without legislative intervention is reflected in the state’s actual
history. By the mid-nineteenth century, the judiciary, without any
legislative action, had significantly eroded sovereign immunity both
with regard to tort actions as well as contract claims.178 Despite this
development, in Rendleman, the court held that the right to sue the state
for tortious conduct ultimately rests in the General Assembly and that its
legislation supersedes any judicial development of the common law.179
However, in reaching this conclusion, the court explained that “in tort
cases, the source of authority or lack thereof to sue the state originally
arose from rights at common law, not from rights contained in the
constitution.”180 Professor Friesen emphasizes this important distinction
in her treatise. Citing to Justice Holmes, she explains that the
justification for sovereign immunity is that legal rights depend on the
authority that makes the law, but this rationale does not apply to
Mr. Rariden, who was opposed to the provision, opined that “it confers a right of
action against the state for all claims.” Further, when asked by Mr. Rariden if this would
allow the state to be sued for outrages upon the rights of individuals, Mr. Howe responded
“Certainly.” Id. at 1282.
175
Id. at 1279.
176
Id. at 1285.
177
“This will remove to courts of justice, where they properly belong, numerous claims
which cannot be urged through a legislative body without temptation to demoralizing
influences.” Id. at 2043.
178
State v. Rendleman, 603 N.E.2d 1333, 1336 (Ind. 1992). However, note that although
the common law permitted suit where a government entity breached a private duty owed
to an individual, governmental entities were still immune from claims resulting from a
breach of its public duties owed to all. Id.
179
Id. at 1337. The court relied on this principle to uphold the legislative authority to
broaden the scope of sovereign immunity through its Tort Claims Act. Id.
180
Id.
174
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violations of a constitution because constitutional rights are not created
by the government in this same way.181 The Indiana Constitution has its
source in the people, not the General Assembly.182
Several state courts have acknowledged that common law sovereign
immunity was never intended to encompass constitutional wrongdoing.
For example, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has reasoned that “it
would . . . be a fanciful gesture to say . . . that citizens have constitutional
individual rights that are protected from encroachment actions by the
State, while . . . saying that individuals whose constitutional rights have
been violated by the State cannot sue because of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.”183 The court determined that although the
legislature traditionally decides when the sovereign is liable, the
judiciary’s responsibility to protect and enforce a state’s fundamental
law was paramount:
“[W]hen there is a clash between these
constitutional rights and sovereign immunity, the constitutional rights
must prevail.”184 Similarly, the Michigan Supreme Court has ruled that
any governmental immunity should not foreclose suits for constitutional
wrongdoing because common law sovereign immunity “should, as a
matter of public policy, lose its vitality when faced with unconstitutional
acts of the state.”185
Professor Friesen persuasively argues that the “creation of each
state’s Bill of Rights, of its own force, impliedly waived governmental
immunity for injuries to those rights.”186 She explains that “the state’s
FRIESEN, supra note 40, § 8-8(a) at 8–49; see also Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The
Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 343 (1995) (arguing in the context of the
Federal Constitution, that “[s]overeign immunity need not, and should not, pose an
obstacle to governmental accountability”); Jefferson, supra note 58, at 1543 (arguing that
“[s]overeign immunity must give way in the face of a constitutional tort claim”).
182
See supra note 168.
183
Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 786, 413 S.E.2d 276, 291 (1992) (holding that the
common law doctrine of sovereign immunity would not bar suit against the state for an
unconstitutional discharge in violation of the state free speech provision). Note that
although the court did not rule out damages, it remanded for a determination of
appropriate remedies, suggesting that monetary damages beyond back pay might intrude
on the prerogatives of the other branches of government. Id. at 788–89, 413 S.E.2d at 293–
94.
184
Id. at 786, 413 S.E.2d at 292.
185
Smith v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 410 N.W.2d 749, 794 (Mich. 1987) (Boyle, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); see also Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 100, 660 A.2d 447, 462
(1995) (reasoning that when government officials violate the state constitution, there must
be a remedy to restrain their actions within constitutional bounds).
186
Specialized immunity for certain legislative, judicial, or prosecutorial functions is
beyond the scope of this Article. See, however, FRIESEN, supra note 40, at 8–27, discussing
these doctrines.
181
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basic charter, which exists to dictate certain boundaries to the
government, would be undermined . . . if government officials were
permitted to violate constitutional rights without financial
consequence.”187 She concedes that this argument is more difficult to
make when the state constitution expressly includes sovereign
immunity,188 but, as discussed, this is not the case in Indiana. To the
contrary, the framers of the Indiana Constitution viewed sovereign
immunity as an “archaic” doctrine that should be jettisoned.189
Moreover, even if a few of the framers viewed sovereign immunity
as part of the common law that withstood enactment of the Indiana Bill
of Rights, they also understood that sovereign immunity was an
evolving doctrine subject to change, both through judicial development
of the common law and through legislative action. As noted, long before
adoption of the Indiana Tort Claims Act, Indiana courts had abolished
sovereign immunity with regard to both tort and contract actions.190
Surely the framers would not have believed that sovereign immunity
would continue to bar claims against the state for constitutional
wrongdoing while states could be readily sued for mere tortious injury
or breaches of contract.191 Further, it has been clear since at least 1972
that governmental entities and actors in Indiana are not shielded by
common law sovereign immunity. In Campbell v. State,192 the court
reasoned that there were only three narrow occasions where common
law sovereign immunity prevented suits: (1) where a city or state fails to
provide adequate police protection to prevent crime; (2) where a state
official makes an appointment of an individual whose incompetent
performance gives rise to a suit alleging negligence in the making of the
appointment; and (3) where judicial decision-making is challenged.193
Id. at 8–49.
Id. at 8–25.
189
See discussion supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text.
190
State v. Rendleman, 603 N.E.2d 1333, 1335 (Ind. 1992).
191
The only clear statement on sovereign immunity that emerges from Indiana law is
that punitive damages against the state are impermissible. The Indiana Supreme Court, in
State v. Denny, 273 Ind. 556, 557, 406 N.E.2d 240, 241–42 (1980), states that “the concept of
the State not having a state of mind or not being deterred by punitive damages should be
the basis for the prohibition of such punitive damages in all cases applicable to the State.”
Id. (emphasis added). The court explained that the provision in the Indiana Tort Claims
Act precluding punitive damages “should be considered as a statement of public policy by
the legislature that the State is not to be considered as being liable for punitive damages
. . . .” Id.; see also Dep’t of Natural Resources v. Evans, 493 N.E.2d 1295, 1303 (Ind. Ct. App.
1986) (holding that punitive damages awarded in a breach of contract action must be
reversed).
192
Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 55, 284 N.E.2d 733 (1972).
193
Id. at 62–63, 284 N.E.2d at 737.
187
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The Indiana Supreme Court reaffirmed the Campbell principles in the
case of Benton v. Oakland City.194 It noted that sovereign immunity will
normally not apply and that exceptions to the presumption of liability
will be “rare.”195 The Bill of Rights was viewed as the fundamental law
of the state—preclusion of damage actions for constitutional wrongdoing
appears antithetical to this basic understanding.196 In short, the doctrine
of sovereign immunity should not serve as a bar to bringing state
constitutional law claims. The framers of the Indiana Constitution
recognized it as an antiquated, absurd doctrine in 1851, and Indiana
courts have largely ignored it. The Indiana Supreme Court today should
give it no more credence.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Indiana Supreme Court should recognize that claims for
damages may be brought for constitutional wrongdoing. The debates,
the text of the constitution, and early case precedent all support this
conclusion. Indiana should join its sister states who have acknowledged
the importance of holding government fully accountable for the
deprivation of cherished constitutional guarantees.

Benton v. Oakland City, 721 N.E.2d 224 (Ind. 1999).
Id. at 230.
196
Note, in the alternative, that even if some legislative action is required to waive
sovereign immunity, the Indiana Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”) states that it applies to a “claim
or suit in tort” without making any distinction as to the types of torts that are acceptable.
The ITCA states that it cannot be construed to waive the Eleventh Amendment or any suit
in federal court or any suit in a state court beyond the boundaries of Indiana. It does not
exempt constitutional actions that sound in tort. IND. CODE § 34-13-3-1 (2004).
194
195

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol40/iss1/1

